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Preface 
 
The outcome document of the 2005 United Nations World Summit called on 
countries to prepare national development strategies, taking into account the 
international development goals agreed in the various United Nations Summits and 
Conferences of the past two decades. In order to assist countries in this task, the 
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) commissioned a 
series of notes for policy-makers and policy-shapers both in the government and civil 
society, in major and interconnected areas relevant to the formulation of national 
development strategies: macroeconomic and growth policies, trade policy, investment 
and technology policies, financial policies, social policy and state-owned enterprise 
reform. The preparation of the notes received generous funding in part from the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Colleagues from UNDP also 
provided helpful suggestions for and comments on the notes.   
 
The policy notes, authored by experts in these fields, draw on the experience and 
dialogues of the United Nations in the economic and social areas, complemented by 
outside knowledge. The notes provide concrete suggestions on the means to achieve 
at the national level, the internationally-agreed development goals synthesized in the 
United Nations Development Agenda. The policy notes are intended to provide those 
at the country level who shape and set policies, with a range of possible alternatives to 
the standard policy solutions that have prevailed over the past two decades, rather 
than to prescribe any single course of action. The notes serve to help countries take 
advantage of and expand  their policy space - their effective room for maneuver in 
formulating and integrating national economic, social, and environmental policies.  
 
I encourage readers to see these notes as complementary inputs into the debate at the 
country level on development challenges faced and the policies needed to meet them. 
The issues chosen are vital pieces of the policy mosaic that underlies national 
development strategies, which are ultimately geared to achieving sustained economic 
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I.  AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
 
This Policy Note addresses (a) how governments can provide a specific pro-poor and 
pro-development focus to their trade policies in a manner that is supportive of MDG 
achievement, and suggests (b) how they can pursue these goals in international trade 
negotiations. 
Background concepts, past and current debates 
Trade policy can constitute a key tool for the achievement of the MDGs. Using trade 
policy as an instrument of industrial diversification and the creation of value added 
remains key. Moreover, exports of goods and services can provide increased incomes 
for poor people, government revenue, opportunities for employment, including high 
paid jobs abroad, particularly for women and young job-seekers. Exports can thus 
contribute to the achievement of MDGs, by lifting people out of poverty (MDG1) and 
empowering women  (MDG3), while  supporting MDG8, whose target 12 aims at a 
trading system in which developing countries can extract greater benefit from the 
international trading system. 
However, the gains from exports may accrue to the richer segments of the population, 
and export industries can damage the environment and otherwise undermine the 
livelihoods of poor people. Imports of goods and services can crowd out domestic 
producers, undermine livelihoods, exacerbate inequalities and push people into 
poverty. At the same time, trade liberalization can bring vital capital and technology, 
as well as essential inputs for improving infrastructures and increasing productivity, 
including that of poor people. 
All WTO members are taking part in the Doha Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations, and most are actively engaged in the negotiation of Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs). In designing and pursuing a trade policy to achieve the MDGs, 
developing countries face the constraints posed by the trade agreements that they have 
accepted. The WTO Multilateral Trade Agreements (MTAs) are both extensive, i.e. 
they discipline a wide range of policy areas central to development strategies, and 
intrusive, i.e. they impose a detailed legal framework on national economic and social 
policies. In addition, many developing countries have entered into regional and 
bilateral, often extra-regional,  FTAs which go beyond the WTO (“WTO plus”) in 
terms of their scope and intrusiveness.  
This new international trading system thus has the disadvantage of constricting the 
policy space available for countries to pursue a development oriented national trade 
policy. Nevertheless,  this presents the opportunity for developing countries to press 
for international trade rules and seek commitments on the part of their trading 
partners  that are supportive of their development goals  - which is precisely what 
MDG8 is intended to achieve. However, this requires that developing countries are 
able (a) to  define such goals in their national policies, and (b) effectively pursue these 
goals in international trade negotiations.  
 
* This Policy Note has been prepared by Murray Gibbs. All comments and queries can be sent to 
esa@un.org  
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The case and options for widening the policy space  
Trade negotiations are aimed at achieving the mutual reduction of tariffs and other 
barriers to trade in goods among the participants. H owever, they also deal with 
measures affecting trade in services (e.g. communications, finance, transportation, 
energy, immigration, even health and education and sanitation), the flow of 
investment and the enforcement of intellectual property rights. The prevailing 
underlying view is that this will lead to improved access to markets and a more 
efficient allocation of resources, stimulating economic growth and development. 
Trade policy should be focused on achieving specific development goals such as the 
elimination of poverty and the achievement of the MDGs.  It should aim at (a) 
enabling poorer people to compete in a  globalized world market, by increasing their 
productivity. It should also (b) ensure the most equitable sharing of benefits of trade, 
so that poor people, women and other disadvantaged groups can draw benefits from 
exports and equality within the country a nd between social groups, regions and 
genders can be promoted. Such policies should (c) shield vulnerable groups from the 
impact of trade liberalization when this threatens their livelihoods and (d) ensure that 
the liberalization of goods and services effectively contributes to these objectives. It 
should be noted that some MDGs, such as access to energy, water and health services, 
are now the subject of international trade negotiations.  
Governments must ensure that the international commitments they enter are 
supportive of these goals. International trade negotiations must aim at providing free 
access to markets for the goods and services of developing countries, while 
committing stronger trading partners to measures supportive of these goals. The 
overall outcomes of such initiatives will be central to the achievement of MDG8, the 
Global Partnership for Development. 
Effective design and implementation  
Government’s ability to define such strategies and to defend and pursue them in 
international trade negotiations is enhanced by more active participation of civil 
society and other stakeholders, who stand to be affected either positively or negatively 
by trade agreements. This process should assist in identifying the pro-poor and pro-
development elements of trade policy which should be incorporated in legislation and 
defended in trade negotiations. At the same time, the actions of other countries that 
could frustrate these objectives should also be identified, and pursued in trade 
negotiations both by seeking s ystemic improvements or specific concession by 
trading partners. A further essential element is to anticipate the actions of other 
countries and seek a national consensus on an appropriate reaction.  
Coverage 
This Policy Note is intended for policy makers  seeking to pursue a development 
strategy through the application of trade policy. It addresses many of the questions 
which every trade policy “practitioner” will inevitably face over the next few years, 
and provides background facts and a set of tools available for the pursuit of the 
MDGs and the development objectives mentioned above. It contains the following 
Sections, in addition to this one and appropriate sectoral annexes: 
Section II - Policy Space for Future National Development Strategies 
Section III - Tariffs and Industrial Policy   
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Section IV – Exports and Poverty 
Section V - Agriculture 
Section VI - Trade in Services 
Section VII - Investment  
Section VIII - Movement of Natural Persons 
Section IX - Intellectual Property for the Poor  
Section X - The FTA Option 
Section XI – Sectoral Annexes 
 
II.  POLICY SPACE FOR FUTURE NATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES 
Theoretical Context 
The purpose of this Policy N ote is not to discuss or focus on trade theory. 
Nevertheless, some theoretical context is nevertheless useful t o anchor the policy 
discussion elaborated in this paper. A brief theoretical context is, therefore, 
summarized below.1  
Few branches of the literature on economics are richer or more controversial than that 
on  international trade. There has been little consensus on the relationship between 
trade and short- to medium-term economic growth—and even less on its role in long-
term economic development. 
The principle of comparative advantage, first described by David Ricardo, forms the 
theoretical  basis for traditional trade theory and provides the rationale for free trade. 
The principle states that even if a country produced all goods more cheaply than other 
countries, it would benefit by specializing in the export of its relatively cheapest good 
(or the good in which it has a comparative advantage). 
Some classical economists believed that comparative advantage was driven by 
differences  in production techniques. Later theoretical developments identified 
differences in factor endowments as the principal basis for comparative advantage. 
Traditional trade analysis  acknowledged the argument for policy intervention 
(protectionism) if market failures created a need for temporary protection of infant 
industries—though direct subsidies were still considered preferable. Intervention was 
also justifiable, though still discouraged, if it could improve a nation’s terms of trade 
by deploying market power. But these were exceptions to the general principle that 
free trade is best.  
Traditional trade theory has been challenged because it often cannot explain actual 
trade patterns. Careful empirical investigations show that many of the theory’s basic 
assumptions -  perfect competition, full employment, perfect factor mobility within 
countries, immobile factors between countries—are unrealistic and do not conform to 
theoretical predictions.  When these assumptions are relaxed, welfare and other 
                                                  
1 See  UNDP et al.,  Making Global Trade Work for People (London and US: Earthscan, 2003) 
(www.earthscan.co.uk), p.25.  
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outcomes are less clear.  Moreover, the introduction of assumptions on differential 
learning effects, positive externalities and technical changes associated with different 
economic activities   creates the theoretical  possibility of weak (if any) gains from 
trade for countries that specialize in low  value-added, labour-intensive products. 
Several analysts have tried to modify, expand or reject some of the conclusions of 
traditional  trade theory. New trade theorists cite the role of scale economies and 
imperfectly competitive markets in determining intra-industry trade patterns among 
industrial countries. This view led strategic trade theorists to argue for subsidizing 
certain industries, to give them  strategic advantage in oligopolistic international 
markets. The recent literature on trade and growth also emphasizes that, in dynamic 
terms, comparative advantage can be created based  on human capital, l earning, 
technology and productivity. It can also change over time based  on economic policy.  
Other responses come from theorists who question the validity of the comparative  
advantage principle, arguing that absolute or competitive advantage is a more reliable 
determinant of trade outcomes. One such response is a macro-level analysis that looks 
at trade in  the context of low aggregate demand, structural unemployment and 
inflexible wage adjustments.  Another argues that international industrial 
competitiveness is determined by the technology gaps between nations. 
The common thread in these different theories is that trade can contribute to growth 
by  expanding markets, facilitating competition and disseminating knowledge. 
Controversy continues  to surround the  efficacy of growth-promoting policy 
intervention. And the trade literature says little about how trade and trade policy relate 
to human development over time.  
The Expanded Reach of International Trade Obligations 
 In addition to this theoretical context,  national t rade policies are formulated and 
implemented within the constraints of international trade commitments that cover a 
wide range of policy areas, many central to development strategies. As such, what is 
possible through national  trade policy is being continuously redefined by the ongoing 
trade negotiating process. In parallel to their  participatiion in the Doha Development 
Round,  most WTO members are also actively engaged in the negotiation of free trade 
agreements (FTAs) with both regional and extra-regional partners. What is the scope 
for the application of pro-poor and pro-development trade policies in this context? 
How can developing countries ensure that the outcome of such negotiations is 
consistent with their development strategies and the pursuit of the MDGs?  
International trade obligations at multilateral, regional and bilateral level have 
become increasingly more extensive and intrusive.  Multilateral obligations were 
accepted as part of a package that was supposed to have given freer and more secure 
market access to developing countries,  by bringing the textiles and clothing and 
agriculture sectors under multilateral disciplines. It was also expected to provide a 
dispute settlement mechanism that would strengthen the rights of smaller countries. 
The WTO “single undertaking”2, agreed by founding WTO members, intensified 
existing multilateral rules relating to tariffs and subsidies, bringing developing 
countries under disciplines from which they had previously been exempt. It also 
                                                  
2 For a complete assessment of the outcome of the Uruguay Round and insight into the adoption of the 
“single undertaking”, see UNCTAD Trade and Development Report 1994, UNCTAD/TDR/14 and 
Supp.1 (Geneva: 1994).  
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extended trade obligations into new areas such as national policies on services (e.g. 
finance, communications, energy, environment, culture, immigration, transportation, 
health and education) and intellectual property rights. Those countries which have 
acceded to the WTO after its establishment find themselves subject to even greater 
constraints, as the major  trading  countries have followed a policy of seeking 
maximum, “WTO plus” concessions in their terms of accession. 
 
Box 1: Terms of Accession
3 
Countries that have acceded to the WTO have been obliged to accept WTO-plus obligations 
and commitments as part of their terms of accession. These have included across the board 
tariff bindings often at low rates, extensive commitments on trade in services, going far 
beyond those made by developing countries in the Uruguay Round, lack of recourse to 
permitted TRIMs (e.g. on transfer of technology), abolition of export taxes, little or no 
recourse to  special safeguards  inn agriculture, additional commitments on energy prices in 
excess of the normal WTO disciplines on subsidies, no access to export subsidies even when 
their GDP is less than $1000. Furthermore, some acceding countries have been denied full 
WTO rights  based  on the argument that they are still in the category of “non-market 
economies” Acceding countries have more recently obtained recognition that the extensive 
commitments contained in their terms of accession should be taken into account in 
multilateral trade negotiations. 
 
This has constricted the policy space available to developing countries to pursue 
development strategies.
4 The WTO Doha Development Round aims at continuing the 
process of liberalization with tighter disciplines. However, it also provides the 
opportunity for developing countries to address difficulties encountered in the 
implementation of the Uruguay Round results. 
Some FTAs are More Constraining 
All developing countries have been caught up in the proliferation of FTAs, both with 
other developing countries (South/South) and between developed and developing 
countries (North/South). Some of these manifest a more ambitious approach by 
developing countries to the pursuit of the traditional objective of regional integration. 
Others, however, are extra-regional, reflecting strategies of individual countries to 
seek privileged market access conditions which they consider cannot be achieved in 
multilateral negotiations. For certain developed countries, the negotiation of bilateral 
FTAs with developing countries has a highly political motivation. It also manifests a 
strategy on their part of imposing tighter and more extensive disciplines on their 
trading partner than can be achieved, at least in the near future, in the WTO, or to 
consolidate positions they are pursuing multilaterally vis-à-vis other major players in 
the WTO. Major trading countries are also involved in the pursuit of geopolitical 
objectives through  some  bilateral and regional trade negotiations, while smaller 
                                                  
3 See, for example, UNCTAD, WTO Accessions and Development Policies (New York and Geneva: 
2001). An acceding country is in a much weaker position under the WTO than it was previously under 
GATT, where the possibility of invoking the non-application clause was excluded once bilateral 
negotiations had been engaged.  
4 UNDP et al.,  Making Global Trade Work for People (London and US: Earthscan, 2003) 
(www.earthscan.co.uk).   
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countries struggle to ensure that their vital sectoral interests are protected.
5 The 
implications of such FTAs for development are discussed in Section X.  
 
Box 2: Frontiers of the Trading System  
Considerations of policy space should bear in mind that there has been a recent tendency for 
multilateral and bilateral trade agreements to overstep the “frontiers” of the trading system. 
As a result, g overnments find that their trade commitments may conflict with other 
instruments and commitments based on consensus, established in other international forums, 
which they have accepted. These include the Convention on Biodiversity, the FAO Treaty on 
Plant Genetic Material, the UN Convention on the Protection of Cultural Contents and 
Artistic Expression, the Johannesburg Sustainable Development Plan of Action, the Rome 
Declaration on Food Security and the Global Strategy on Health for All. 
To carry the analogy further, WIPO accepted that the whole set of intellectual property 
instruments would be incorporated into the WTO TRIP S Agreement as this gave them more 
“teeth” under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. On the other hand, there has been 
considerable resistance from WHO and UNESCO to subjecting what are seen as fundamental 
rights to health, education and cultural identity to trade disciplines. The FAO, on the other 
hand, is actively preparing technical papers on issues related to its central goals, such as food 
security. The “frontiers” between the WTO rules and the Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements (MEAs) are currently being defined under the Doha mandate.
6  The inclusion of 
labour standards wa s not accepted.  
 
Development Strategies and Trade Negotiations  
This new emerging trading system imposes rules on the exercise of trade policies (in 
the broadest sense)  both  through general obligations, which apply to all WTO 
members, and specific commitments that individual countries have accepted. All 
developing countries are being subject to intense pressures to enter into additional 
binding commitments, at multilateral, regional, sub-regional and bilateral levels, to 
liberalize trade and investment and accept intrusive disciplines over an ever widening 
scope of development policy areas. Governments in developing countries will need to 
make major decisions  on the extent they are willing to constrict policy options in 
order to gain trade benefits. The  dilemma they face is on how to preserve 
development strategies in the context of multiple negotiations with regional and extra-
regional, developed and developing partners. 
A prerequisite to participating in trade negotiations should be a clear definition of a 
pro-poor national trade and development policy . Such policy should be aimed at 
ensuring that the poor do not inordinately bear the burd en of adjustment, but 
maximize the benefits from trade liberalization and trade disciplines. The pursuit of 
three complementary and mutually supportive goals, on (a) an industrial policy based 
on tariffs, investment and services, (b) a proactive attack  on barriers to exports 
                                                  
5 See Gibbs, Murray and Swarnim Wagle, with Pedro Ortega, The Great Maze: Regional and Bilateral 
Free Trade Agreements in Asia, UNDP Asia Pacific Trade and Investment Initiative (Colombo: 2005) 
(http://www.undprcc.lk/Publications/Publications/Great_Maze_-_FTA_-_completed.pdf). 
6 See WTO  document, “ Matrix on Trade Measures Pursuant to Selected MEAs”, 
WT/CTE/W/160/rev.1, 14 July 2001 (www.wto.org).   
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supported by measures that ensure that the benefits of export growth are shared 
equitably, and (c) the protection of food security and rural livelihoods, should set in 
play a virtuous spiral of growth, poverty reduction and human development. The 
objective of trade negotiations should be the preservation of  national  policy space 
needed for development and  achievement of  the MDGs, while obtaining 
commitments from trading partners supportive of these development objectives. 
Preparing a Strategy 
A first step would be to review trade policies (i.e. trade in the broad sense of covering 
all matters subject to “ trade” concessions) to target those most conducive to pro -poor 
and pro-development outcomes and  the achievement of the MDGs. These can be 
divided into those where the maintenance of domestic policy space would seem 
crucial, and those where the objective would be to obtain action on the part of other 
countries, with the support of policy measures at the national level. Policy measures 
at the national and international levels would focus on (a) preventing the poor from 
bearing the burden of trade disciplines  and liberalization and (b) equipping poorer 
people to derive maximum benefit from trade and globalization. In both cases, the 
achievement of the MDGs would be a central  objective. 
Governments which have not clearly defined their interests and goals inevitably find 
themselves on the defensive in trade negotiations. A pro-development trade policy not 
solidly based on a broad national consensus will not be defensible for long in 
negotiations, as it will come under pressure from foreign trade negotiators, 
multilateral financial institutions and special interest groups within the country. A 
solid consensus building exercise should,  therefore, be seen as a prerequisite for 
effective participation in trade negotiations. This is to preempt the risk of “elite 
capture”, where special interests are successful in distorting priorities to serve their 
own interests at the expense of other segments of society. This can result in 
undermining development strategies and give rise to political conflict. An intensive 
consensus b uilding process involving all stakeholders can greatly strengthen the 
ability of governments to achieve a pro development, pro-poor outcome in trade 
negotiations. A consensus should be reached on a list of priorities to be pursued in 
trade negotiations, whether at the multilateral, regional or bilateral level. 
This strategy would incorporate pro-poor  and pro-development  objectives into 
national trade legislation and regulation, and anticipate the requests of trading 
partners so as to prepare to protect existing pro-MDG programmes and preserve 
policy space for future initiatives. A bottom-up pro-poor and pro-development trade 
strategy could be devised so as to attain the following goals in domestic policy and 
trade negotiations:  
Goal A: to protect the most v ulnerable segments of the population  and  to  ensure 
greater equality within national societies,  notably  by providing  universal access to 
basic services, health, education, water and sanitation and energy, and to protect poor 
farmers from disruptive surges of imports that could threaten their livelihoods. 
Negotiating strategy: to defend national policies and  regulations in negotiations 
on trade in services and investment,  (Sections  6 and  7) and flexibilities in 
agricultural trade regimes,  (Section  5), and  of  ensuring  access to medicines 
(Section 9). 
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Goal B: to  empower people to become productive members of their national societies 
and compete in the world economy. 
Negotiating strategy:  to  retain the flexibility to implement a coherent industrial 
policy, and export strategy setting off the virtuous upward spiral (Sections 3 and 
4),  obtaining advanced capital and technology,  (Sections 5,  6,  7 and  8) while 
building upon traditional knowledge and community achievements (Section 9). 
Goal C: to establish a set of objectives which should be pursued as a demandeur in 
trade negotiations, seeking commitments from other trading partners either in terms of 
specific concessions on their part or acceptance of trade rules that will serve to make 
the international trading environment more supportive of the national development 
strategy7. 
Negotiating  strategy: to pursue the elimination of tariffs and tighter disciplines 
over the application of restrictive trade measures in negotiations at the 
multilateral, regional, plurilateral and bilateral levels (Sections 2, 3  and 10).  
The WTO Multilateral Negotiations and the MDGs 
The goals of the Doha Declaration are consistent with the objectives outlined in this 
Policy Note. In this context, developing countries have been insisting that 
commitments be made to deal with measures most inimical to their exports (e.g. 
agricultural subsidies in developed countries) as a prerequisite to liberalization on 
their part. All WTO members are participating in the Doha Round whose final 
package was more clearly defined at the sixth WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong 
Kong in December 2005.
8 
While the Doha Declaration sets out objectives aimed at further liberalization, it also 
recognizes development objectives and the need to revisit certain obligations from a 
development perspective. Certain actions have already been taken, such as the 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health and some measures deriving from it (eg. 
Paragraph 6). Some of the new “Singapore” issues opposed by developing countries 
have also b een withdrawn from the agenda as a result of the Cancun Ministerial 
Conference. What can be achieved in the multilateral trade negotiations that could be 
supportive of development strategies and is it possible to foresee the main elements of 
the Doha outcome that will set the multilateral framework within which trade policies 
will be formulated and pursued.
9 
 
                                                  
7 See UNCTAD, A Positive Agenda for Future Trade Negotiations (UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/10) (New 
York and Geneva: 2000), which sets out the spectrum of developing country goals in multilateral trade 
negotiations (http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/itcdtsb10_en.pdf). 
8  See Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration WT/MIN(05)/Dec, and other relevant documents on 
www.wto.org. 
9 See Das, Bhagirath Lal, The Current Negotiations in the WTO, options, opportunities and risks for 
developing countries (ZED books, London: 2005) www.zedbooks.co.uk.  
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Box 3: Doha Round Suspension 
On 27 July 2006, the WTO General Council took note of the statements that had been made 
by delegations and the Director General to suspend the Doha Round multilateral trade 
negotiations. The talks broke down due to the inability to reach trade offs between the 
liberalization of industrial tariffs and the reduction of domestic subsidies  and tariffs on 
agriculture.
10 In particular, the United States did not consider that it was in a position to 
accept a commitment to reduce its total trade distorting domestic support below $23 billion. 
Such breakdowns in multilateral negotiations are not new, (e.g. Brussels 1990)
11, and  in 
January 2007 the WTO Director General announced  the full resumption of the negotiations.  
 
Policy space objectives: 
Some action will require multilateral agreement, and thus must be pursued in concert 
with other interested countries, such as flexibilities to protect poor farmers ( SP and 
SSM), maintenance or exclusion of plant varieties from patenting, more effective 
rules to prevent bio-piracy, more flexibility to raise bound tariff rates, resistance to 
excessive liberalization  through formulas in tariffs and services. Other will  involve 
defense of policy measures in direct negotiations with trade partners in response to 
requests for liberalization commitments on tariffs and services.  
 
Box 4: Trade Policy Space Rationale 
The question arises: why protect “space” for trade policy? 
It can be argued that before 1995, developing countries largely “enjoyed” a free hand in the 
area of trade policy, and for the most part, with the exceptions that will be noted in the text, 
did not take advantage of this policy space to develop their economies.  
The contraction of policy space which resulted through trade negotiations in GATT, but most 
dramatically after the entry into force of the WTO on an almost universal basis, was aimed to 
provide greater security of access for traders and investors, while the more stringent rule of 
law in the trade field was seen to be beneficial to developing countries as weaker partners in 
the international trading system. 
Acceptance of the more intrusive and extensive trade disciplines described above is also seen 
as providing governments with an effective defense against protectionist pressures at home. 
For developing countries, such disciplines were viewed as needed to “lock in” the trade 
regimes imposed under temporary structural adjustment programmes imposed by the Bretton 
Woods institutions, which were considered as inherently beneficial for developing countries. 
These binding disciplines would provide the base for further trade liberalization and the 
further extension of the “frontiers” of the trading system to submit an ever widening range of 
policy measures to enforcement through the threat of trade sanctions. This was assumed to 
lead to ever increasing trade and accelerated economic growth. 
However, this logic overlooked three important factors. 
First, the process of development followed by successful countries, both those now 
considered highly developed, and those which have more recently industrialized (e.g. Asian 
                                                  
10 See analysis by B.L. Das in SUNS, 2 August 2006 www.sunsonline.org. 
11  See comparison to breakdown of 1990 Brussels GATT Ministerial M eeting by Chakravarthi 
Raghavan in SUNS, 28 July 2006 www.sunsonline.org.  
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Tigers), has not followed the Bretton Woods model. These countries have  applied a set of 
“tools” to protect infant industries, obtain advanced technologies and penetrate world markets 
that had been available under the more flexible GATT. These  are now severely constrained 
under the WTO. Some of these countries were never GATT contracting parties and o nly 
recently acceded to the WTO. The intensified disciplines under the WTO have reduced the 
policy space available to other countries and precluded the possibility of their emulating some 
of the strategies which had proven successful earlier.  
Second, the pursuit of ever more stringent trade disciplines did not take into account the 
potential conflict with other development objectives, particularly those aimed at improving 
the living conditions of poorer people in developing countries as set out in the MDGs. In one 
dramatic case, the Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health had to be introduced in Doha to 
literally save people’s lives. Beginning most dramatically at the 1999 Seattle WTO 
Ministerial Conference, some governments and civil society groups have challenged the goals 
of the ongoing negotiating process, drawing attention to a serious conflict between the goals 
of evermore intrusive and extensive trade disciplines and the need for policy space to pursue 
pro-poor policies such as food and livelihood security (agriculture), universal access to basic 
services, access to technology (services) and traditional community interests (TRIPS). There 
has been a growing democratization of trade policy formulation in both developed and 
developing countries. A wider range of stakeholders have  demanded that their vital interests 
be protected and  have  rejected  a  secretive negotiation process. They have also observed that 
with the establishment of the WTO, the multilateral trading system has also extended its 
“frontiers” into policy areas where international consensus had been reached in other 
organizations such as the FAO, UNESCO and WHO.  
Third, the commitment of the major trading countries to the multilateral trading system has  
declined, as they  have pursued  the negotiation of reciprocal  FTAs with developing countries  
that had previously enjoyed unilateral preferential access to their markets. Furthermore, the 
return to bilateralism  has  also reflected a resurgence of political considerations in trade 
relations, precisely what the post-war GATT system had been set up to avoid.
12 FTAs 
exacerbate the difficulties described above, as they often totally eliminate any policy space 
that developing countries may have succeeded in defending in the WTO. They represent a 
negotiating process that is more political, less transparent and less likely to be based on 
national consensus than the multilateral trade regime.  
The most important decisions relating to policy space to be faced by policy makers in the 
WTO multilateral trade negotiations relate to (a) measures to protect food security  (Section 
5), (b) preservation of flexibility in industrial tariff negotiations (Section 3), and (c) response 
to formula approaches for commitments on trade in services (Section 6). However, by far the 
greatest overall challenge lies in devising a response to the proliferation of FTAs (Section 
10), which cover all issues addressed in this Policy Note.  
 
Market Access Objectives:  
-  elimination of agricultural export subsidies and meaningful reduction of 
production subsidies, including with respect to all “boxes”, a significant increase 
in TRQs maintained by developed countries or the elimination of over quota tariff 
rates;  
                                                  
12  VanGrasstek, Craig,  “U.S. Policy Towards Free Trade Agreements: Strategic Perspectives and 
Extrinsic Objectives”, UNDP Asia Trade Initiative on Trade and Human Development, Phase 1, 
technical support document (Hanoi: 2003) (available at 
www.undprcc.lk/Publications/Publications.asp?C=4).   
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-  bound, duty- and quota-free access to developed country markets for all (not just 
97%) exports of LDCs, i.e. including textiles and clothing; and duty-free access to 
developed country markets in other sectors of key export interest to developing 
countries;  
-  tighter multilateral rules on resort to contingency trade measures affecting exports 
(e.g. to introduce more stringent disciplines in resort to anti-dumping duties 
against developing  country exports, and measures  to  reduce the impact of such 
duties when applied);  
-  improved access under Mode 4 of GATS for  movement of service suppliers in 
occupations of export interest to  developing countries,  and the p rotection of 
traditional knowledge and prevention of bio-piracy for exported products (e.g. 
GIs) 
 
Box 5: Trade Negotiations and Human Development 
The UNDP Asia Pacific Initiative on Trade, Human Development and Economic Governance 
took on the task, (in 2002), of assessing the impact of various potential outcomes of trade 
negotiations on human development. The conduct of such analysis required at least a working 
definition of human development as applied to trade. The Asia Trade Initiative examined the 
literature on human development and identified four central components against which trade 
outcomes could be assessed, focusing on selected areas of trade negotiations for which the 
outcome could be expected to impact on a large number of people, particularly  poor people ( 
agriculture, fisheries, MNP, energy services, environmental services ,investment, TRIPs, and 
textiles and clothing  as well as the  WTO plus provisions of FTAs ). Each trade measure 
proposed in the negotiations was assessed  against whether it  (a) would  enhance  the 
empowerment of poor people, i.e. would they gain more ability to shape the processes and 
events that affect their lives, (b) would permit poorer people  to increase their productivity so 
as to enable them to compete in a globalised world economy, including through open and 
secure access for their exports, (c) would contribute to equity through increasing 
opportunities for those disadvantaged segments o f the population (e.g.  isolated regions, 
women, minority en ethnic groups), including through their  access to vital services and (d) 
would be sustainable, in the sense that the  measures could be implemented without entailing 
welfare losses for poorer groups of the population or future generations.   
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III.  TARIFFS AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
With the general elimination of quantitative restrictions, tariffs remain the main 
measure available for the protection of domestic industries. Tariffs are also a major 
source of revenue for the governments of many developing countries, particularly 
LDCs and small island developing states (SIDS). Tariffs are, therefore, an essential 
tool for industrial policy for both reasons. How can  such policy be oriented to 
achieving the MDGs? What is the role of tariffs in industrial policy and how should 
governments react to requests for further tariff liberalization commitments?  
Industrial Policy and Trade Negotiations 
Industrial policy requires a coordinated approach to most of the spectrum of trade 
policies subject to international disciplines which are currently the subject of trade 
negotiations. These include tariff policy, subsidies, policies to develop an efficient 
services infrastructure and producer service sector, (e.g. telecommunications, 
financial services, transportation services, other producer services, policies with 
respect to movement of persons), investment policy, and intellectual property rights. 
The execution of a coherent industrial policy thus calls for a coordinated negotiating 
strategy covering all aspects of trade negotiations. The effectiveness of tariffs as a tool 
for industrialization is also linked to the monetary policy framework within which it 
operates. When the capital account is liberalized control over exchange rates may be 
lost and the appreciation of exchange rates can obviously undermine export 
competitiveness and the impact of tariff protection. 
Box 6: Components of Trade Related Industrial Policy 
In addition to formal trade measures, such as import and export tariffs and quantitative 
restrictions, other trade measures, which are currently the subject of trade agreements or 
negotiations, are also essential components of a coherent trade and industrial policy. These 
include: 
-  Export promotion policies, which  provide employment,  higher incomes and foreign 
exchange to finance industrialization (Section 4); 
-  Agricultural policies, which reduce dependence on imports of essential food products and 
provide support for agro-industrial export income where possible (Section 5); 
-  Policies aimed at establishing an efficient services infrastructure, obtaining advanced 
producer services and associated technology, and access to distribution channels (Section 
6), as well as access to low cost energy; 
-  Investment policies that maximize the contribution of FDI to industrial development 
through access to capital and technology in key sectors. (Section 7); 
-  Intellectual property policies aimed at facilitating access to technology and low cost 
generic drug production (Section 9); 
-  Provisions to promote industrial cooperation in FTAs (Section 10); 
-  MNP can also be an important component of industrial policy, providing export income 
and upgrading the skills of industrial workers (Sections 6 and 8).
13 
                                                  
13 See Vu Quoc Huy et al.,  “Trade in Services,  Movement of  Natural  Persons and Human 
Development : Country Case Study  - Vietnam ”,  UNDP Asia Trade Initiative on Trade and Human 
Development, Phase 1, technical support document (Hanoi: 2003) (available at 
www.undprcc.lk/Publications/Publications.asp?C=4).    
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Public-Private Partnerships 
Industrial policy is likely to work best if it is based on a strategic partnership between 
the public and private sectors and if government policy is successful in eliciting 
relevant information from the private sector  - on the most binding constraints and 
externalities which the private sector faces - and is able to effectively deal  with them. 
This is most likely to stimulate the entrepreneurial spirits of the private sector which 
are a crucial ingredient of successful industrial policy.  Nevertheless, w hile the 
government should be close to the private sector’s concerns, it must avoid being 
captured by special private sector interest groups if this policy is to serve the broader 
national interest. Strong state institutions and a clear government vision will be 
crucial to achieving this. 
Tariff Liberalization and Bindings 
Tariffs are only one crucial ingredient of industrial policy, albeit an important one. 
Over the past twenty years developing countries have phased out quantitative 
restrictions and many have reduced tariffs, in some cases dramatically. The tariff 
reductions have usually been implemented as conditions for World Bank/IMF 
structural adjustment loans and programmes, which are by nature temporary. 
However, there has been strong pressure on developing countries to bind these low 
tariffs in the WTO, so as to “lock in” economic reforms, as an element in their 
Uruguay Round “package” of concessions. The pressure to do this has increased for 
countries newly acceding to the WTO or within the framework of FTAs. At present, 
developing countries are under pressure to further reduce, and bind, industrial tariffs 
in the Doha Round in line with a tariff cutting and harmonization formula being 
worked out in the NAMA (non-agricultural market access) group.
14 
Tariffs reductions can impact the achievement of the MDGs in at least three ways.  
(a) They may lead to a surge in imports forcing domestic competitors out of business 
and causing increased unemployment in developing countries. Those so losing 
their jobs as a result are unlikely to find any alternative employment and many 
will sink below the poverty line.  
(b) Tariff cuts can result in a reduction of government revenue, leaving the 
government with  fewer resources for fighting poverty  and for other social 
programmes.  
(c) Tariff reductions may undermine industrialization policies in developing countries 
(“nip industrialization in the bud”) by exposing industries to competition before 
they are strong enough to compete in the world. 
Over 77 per cent of MFN tariffs in developing countries, and 44 per cent in LDCs, are 
bound15 in the WTO, although many at relatively high rates, greatly exceeding current 
applied rates and allowing a considerable degree of flexibility. The use of tariffs as a 
tool of industrial policy is obviously a function of the flexibility that individual 
countries retain in their tariff schedules. Many developing countries have avoided 
                                                  
14 The Third World Network had drawn up a table showing the tariff cuts that would result from the 
application of the “Swiss” tariff cutting formula using different coefficients. See www.twnside.org.sg. 
15  See Fernandez de Cordoba, Santiago, Coping with Trade Reforms, Implications of the  WTO 
Industrial Tariff Negotiations for Developing Countries, UNCTAD (Geneva: 2005).  
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across the board tariff bindings. For a number of relatively advanced developing 
countries in Asia for example, the level of bindings on industrial products is around 
60 percent of tariff lines. In Africa there is no set pattern. Almost one third of African 
countries have bound less than 10 percent of their industrial tariff schedules, while 
another third have bound over 90 per cent. Over 85 percent of Latin American 
countries have bound over 90 per cent.
16 Flexibility is also provided by the levels of 
tariffs, as many countries have bound their tariff at relatively high rates and maintain 
an applied tariff at much lower levels. These high tariff bindings generally cover all 
industrial products, without much variation among sectors. Tariff policy is also 
restrained by FTAs that eliminate tariff flexibility among partners, and can drastically 
affect the scope for industrial tariff policy. 
Box 7: The Fiscal Implications of Trade Liberalization 
Trade liberalization over the past 20 years has indeed primarily taken the form of reductions 
in tariffs levied on imports in the context of bi- or multilateral agreements. Yet, customs 
duties continue to represent a significant share of fiscal revenue in most developing regions –
and in particular in the least developed countries and small island countries, where reliance on 
trade taxes may exceed 25 per cent. The net revenue-impact of trade liberalization, which has 
received much attention in the literature*, depends on assumptions that make it theoretically 
ambiguous. It has been argued that in addition to the marginal (assumed to be positive) effect 
of trade liberalization on growth, the introduction of consumption-based taxes –and of a 
Value Added Tax more specifically- would offset the short term negative impacts on 
government revenues.  
Yet, empirical results suggest that such has not been the case, in particular for countries that 
rely most on trade taxes: for every dollar lost in tariffs, poor and middle-income countries 
have at best been able to recover 30 cents from other sources.
17 Even more troubling is the 
fact that these countries are those where government revenues as a share of GDP are already 
among the lowest for a variety of structural reasons – urbanization rates, population density, 
dependency ratio- and economic reasons, and where public investments are much needed to 
reduce poverty and achieve the MDGs. Explanations for the inability of poorer countries to 
make up for the loss in tariffs revenues include the institutional and administrative challenges 
posed by the introduction of VAT in economies where a sizeable share of transactions occurs 
in the informal sector, and where central and local tax authorities lack the technical capacities 
required to collect taxes, prevent leakages and tax evasion and implement necessary controls. 
Further, it has been argued
18 that a revenue-neutral reform of tariffs and VAT rates could be 
welfare-reducing in the context of highly informal economies where the increased reliance on 
VAT will exacerbate the distortions between the formal and informal sectors. It is clear, 
therefore, that trade liberalization has far-reaching fiscal and institutional implications and 
calls for the design of comprehensive technical assistance and capacity building programs 
that should be a priority of aid-for-trade initiatives (see Section III).  
* Sources: Dollar, David and Aart Kraay ‘Trade, Growth and Poverty’ World Bank Working Paper 
2615, 2001; Greenaway, David, Wyn Morgan and Peter Wright, “Trade Liberalization and Growth in 
Developing Countries”, Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 67, 2002; and Rodriguez, Francisco 
and Dani Rodrik, “Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic’s Guide to the Cross National 
Evidence”, NBER Working Paper 7081, 1999. 
                                                  
16 See Bacchetta, Marc and Bijit Bora, Industrial Tariffs and the Doha Development Agenda, WTO 
discussion paper (Geneva: 2003), http://www.wto.org/English/res_e/booksp_e/discussion_papers_e.pdf   
17  Baunsgaard, Thomas  and Michael Keen, “Tax Revenue and (or?) Trade Liberalization”, IMF 
Working Paper WP/05/112, June 2005. 
18  St iglitz, Joseph and M. Shahe Emran, “Price Neutral Tax  reform With an Informal Economy”, 
Econometric Society, 2004 North American Summer Meetings 493.  
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Tariff Policy and Industrialization Strategy  
A successful industrialization policy is one which allows a country to draw benefits 
from the globalization process by moving from static to d ynamic comparative 
advantage. In this context, an appropriate balance in industrial policy design needs to 
be struck between the need for countries to take advantage of external effects that lead 
to the emergence of dynamic competitive advantage over time while at the same time 
recognizing that different countries will be better at producing different goods. 
Within this framework, the starting point is typically resource-based and labour 
intensive manufactures,  often, but not always, the development of a textile and 
clothing industry (see Annex A to Section 3). The industrialization process starting 
from this initial type of industry should lead to the production of medium technology 
consumer goods and then up the ladder to high technology consumer and capital 
goods production. The success of some developing countries in world trade  (eg. 
Republic of Korea)  has, to a significant effect, been a function of their ability to 
manufacture and export increasingly higher technology manufactured goods.  
The need for tariff protection changes as countries move up this ladder. At the first 
stage, tariffs are required to develop domestic labour intensive consumer goods 
industries.  At  a subsequent stage, it is the relatively more advanced technology 
production that requires tariff protection to encourage investors to enter into 
technologically more complex activities. At this stage, the protection for the lower 
stage industries can be phased out. Such an approach can help attain the MDGs by 
ensuring that new, higher value added more advanced industries are established to 
provide better quality employment opportunities for those in the more labour 
intensive industries before the latter are exposed to international competition. This 
should also provide more decent and productive work for youth in higher technology 
industries (MDG8, Target 17), by stimulating a virtuous spiral of growth, poverty 
reduction and human development.19  
 
Box 8: Social Sustainability Threshold 
In the absence of the “virtual upward spiral” mentioned above there would be a risk of a w 
downward spiral that could drop below the “social sustainability threshold”, i.e., the absolute 
limit of negative effects of policies or economic reform measures (such as trade 
liberalization), in terms of the deterioration of the situation or their economic prospects and 
opportunities, which a social group or society in general is willing to support without 
revolting in one way or another,. Below this threshold, a country enters a turbulent area of 
social disturbance, economic breakdown and overall instability where economic laws no 
longer hold (preventing anticipated future positive effects of reform from materializing).
20 
                                                  
19  See also  Malhotra,  Kamal,  “National Trade and Development Strategies: Suggested Policy 
Directions” (April 2006), background paper for UNDP Asia-Pacific Human Development Report, 
Trade on Human Terms: Transforming Trade for Human Development in Asia and the Pacific, UNDP, 
June 2006. See also Akyuz, Yilmaz, The WTO Negotiations on Industrial Tariffs, What is at Stake for 
Developing Countries, Geneva 2005. 
20  See Ivan Martin In Search of Development along the Southern Border: The Economic Models 
Underlying the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy paper 
presented to Seminar on Free Trade Agreements in the Arab Region 9-11 December 2006 
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Such t ariff policy should ensure that industries clearly perceive that high tariff 
protection will not  be maintained indefinitely and industries that do not become 
competitive will be allowed to disappear. Moreover, it is important to assess whether 
tariffs are really forward looking and for  genuine  infant industry protection or 
whether they are actually fo r the protection of dying industries or those which have no 
chance of becoming viable and internationally competitive. They should be favoured 
for forward looking industries and purposes, not for dying or unviable industries. 
Despite these caveats, however,  developing countries should ensure that they retain 
the ability to shift tariff protection from low to intermediate to high technology 
sectors as they move up the technology ladder, through a system of “cascading” 
tariffs. This could be achieved by not binding tariffs, or binding them at very high 
levels, or seeking exceptions for strategic sectors in the application of any tariff 
reduction formula. Ways should be sought to introduce more flexibility to tariff 
bindings accepted by countries at lower levels of industrialization, for example, a 
streamlined and more liberal interpretation of GATT Article XVIII:C which permits 
developing countries to deviate from their multilateral commitments, if necessary for 
the “establishment of a particular industry”.21 While it is true that some countries, 
especially LDCs, may not have all the necessary  prerequisites to use tariff policy 
effectively in the manner described because of a small internal market or no clearly 
identifiable dynamic manufacturing industry, they should retain the policy space to 
pursue such strategies in the future in case either their circumstances change, or they 
are able to enter regional integration agreements with other developing countries 
which make such policies and industries viable.  
Successful countries have used tariff treatment in tandem with other trade measures 
(quantitative restrictions, subsidies) and investment regulations (performance and 
ownership requirements, incentives) to achieve this upward spiral. As the WTO has 
reduced the  scope to apply many of these measures (e.g. export subsidies, local 
content requirements, QRs), tariff policy  has become relatively more important as a 
tool for industrialization in developing countries.  
                                                                                                                                                
  
21 This possibility was highlighted in the Decision on Implementation Issues and Concerns, annexed to 
the Doha Ministerial Declaration.  
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Box 9: The experience of the Republic of Korea 
The Republic of  Korea moved up the virtuous spiral, graduating in two decades from a 
largely agricultural country exporting cheap labour intensive products, such as textiles and 
clothing, to a fully industrialized country where manufactures represent 88% of exports and 
37 % of GDP. GDP in 1960 was a mere US$82, lower than most LDCs today, while its per-
capita GDP in 2005 was US$16,291 and is fast approaching US$20,000. It also has a very 
high HDI. The Republic of  Korea  prioritized export promotion as the means of financing 
higher value added industries on its way up the technological ladder. Its strategy was to use a 
range of “tools” including tariffs and quantitative restrictions (QRs), local content, transfer of 
technology and export performance requirements to increase bargaining power with foreign 
investors, favouring those willing to transfer technology or with more effective export 
distribution channels.
22 The formation of large conglomerates was actively promoted. 
Building on the success in the production and export of light industry products, The Republic 
of Korea established heavy industries such as steel, petrochemicals, shipbuilding, industrial 
machinery, non-ferrous metal refining and electrical industries. It has now prioritized high 
technology industries such as semi-conductors. There has been substantial development and 
transformation in the Republic of Korea in the last 45 years. The major industries during the 
1960s were labour-intensive industries such as wigs, artificial eyelashes, clothes and plywood 
while in 2005 the major industries were shipbuilding, automobiles, semiconductors and steel. 
The top three export items in the 1970s were textiles, plywood and wigs while in 2005 these 
were semiconductors, automobiles and wireless telecom.
23  
In the example given above, the Republic of Korea relied on QRs to protect infant 
industries and as a “carrot” for investors. These were covered by the balance of 
payments provisions of Article XVIII:B of GATT. It lost the use of this instrument 
during the Uruguay Round. Countries unable to otherwise justify QRs (under balance 
of payments provisions) are not permitted to impose local content or trade balancing 
requirements which are prohibited under the TRIMs Agreement. 
Tariff policy  also has to address the question of the impact of tariffs on the cost of 
inputs for export industries. For example, should industries producing inputs be given 
tariff protection to foster backward linkages, or should all protection on inputs be 
eliminated to reduce costs for the processing industry? Tariffs can be an impediment 
to good export performance because they could raise the cost of inputs and make the 
final products uncompetitive. For example, in the case of Pakistan, protection against 
man-made fibre imports to shelter the cotton industry led to a decline in 
competitiveness for exports of made up articles and clothing.24 Tariff draw back 
schemes can also be a solution, but they are often difficult to administer. 
                                                  
22  See Shin, Jang-Sup and Jang-Sup Chang,  “Foreign Investment Policy and Human Development 
Country study: Republic of Korea”, in Seih Mei Ling ed.,  Investment, Energy and Environmental 
Services: Promoting Human Development in WTO Negotiations, University of Malaya, UNDP, and 
Malaysian Institute of Economic Research (Kuala Lumpur, March 2004) http://www.um.edu.my. See 
also DoHoon Kim, Presentation on Trade Promotion and Economic Development in Korea, Korea 
Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade, 29 May 2006, in file with author. 
23 See DoHoon Kim, op. cit.. 
24 See Khan, Zubair, The Impact of the post -ATC Environment on Pakistan’s Textiles Trade, UNDP 
Asia Trade Initiative on Trade and Human Development, Phase 1, technical support document, (Hanoi: 
2003) (www.undprcc.lk/Publications/Publications.asp?C=4).   
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Export duties can also be an element of an industrialization strategy, by ensuring 
supplies of lower cost raw material inputs for domestic industry
25.  
Box 10: Mongolia - Removal of export restrictions and taxes 
Mongolia was obliged to eliminate its export restrictions and phase out its export duties on 
raw cashmere under its terms of accession to the WTO. As a result, raw cashmere is now 
exported to China and the cashmere processing sector has all but disappeared.
26 It is estimated 
that if all raw cashmere produced in Mongolia were fully processed into finished knitted and 
woven products before export, such exports would generate $206 million in reserve, more 
than all T&C exports. Moreover, employment in the processing industry would more than 
double.
27 On the other hand, the poor herders were able to obtain higher prices for their raw 
cashmere from Chinese buyers who required the longer Mongolian fibres to improve the 
quality of their fabric.  
 
Services and Industrial Policy 
The services sector should also be seen as relevant to industrial policy. For some 
countries, it will simply make little sense, at least in the short-term, to develop a 
manufacturing sector. In such cases, priority should be given to the development of a 
dynamic non-manufacturing sector (eg. tourism).  
Energy  services will also be central to industrial policy, especially the ability to 
provide energy domestically at rates less than those prevailing on the world market. 
The Doha Round is the first time that energy policy has been seriously addressed in 
multilateral trade negotiations, covering subsidies, export restrictions and taxes, 
energy services, trade and environment and domestic excise taxes.28 Concessions on 
energy policy have been made by countries acceding to the WTO.  
However, a wide range of TRIMs are still permitted including transfer of technology 
and export performance requirements (see Section  VII). Moreover, performance 
requirements are encouraged for developing countries as a means of acquiring 
technology or access to information networks and distribution channels in the services 
sector (see S ection  VI), even though s ome acceding countries have agreed to 
eliminate certain TRIMs and performance requirements that would otherwise have 
been permitted by the WTO. 
                                                  
25 Under the WTO export duties have the same status as import duties, they are limited only to the 
extent that they have been bound in multilateral trade negotiations. 
26 See Tsog tbaatar, Damedin,  Mongolia’s WTO Accession: Expectations and Realities of WTO 
Membership (www.wto.org/English/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case29_e.htm).  
27  See Adhikari, Ratnakar and Yumito Yamamamoto, “Sewing Thoughts, How to Realize  Human 
Development Gains in the Post-Quota World”, UNDP Asia Pacific Trade and Investment Initiative, 
April 2006 (www.undprcc.lk/Publications/Publications/TC_Tracking_Report_April_2006.pdf). 
28 See Gibbs, Murray, Energy in the WTO: What is at stake?, in Sieh Mei Ling ed. Investment, Energy 
and Environmental Services: Promoting Human Development in WTO Negotiations, University of 
Malaya, UNDP, and Malaysian Institute of Economic Research, Kuala Lumpur, March 2004, 
(www.um.edu.my).  
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Subsidies 
Developing countries are permitted to apply production subsidies unless these are 
shown to cause serious prejudice to the interests of other countries. Any subsidy that 
is not specific, in that it is generally available to all enterprises is “non actionable” 
under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. For example, 
the provision of energy at costs lower than those prevailing on the world market (dual 
price system) is not considered to constitute an actionable subsidy, so long as the 
cheaper access is generally available throughout the economy.
29 Export subsidies, i.e. 
subsidies contingent upon export performance are prohibited to all WTO members, 
except LDCs and a group of lower income countries which will enjoy this freedom 
until they reach $1000 per capita GNP.30 
                                                  
29  See UNCTAD,  Energy and Environmental Services, Negotiating Objectives and Development 
Priorities, (ed. Simonetta Zarrilli) UNCTAD/DITC/TNCD/2003/3, Geneva, July 2005. 
30 WTO Agreement on Subsides and Countervailing Measures Annex VII.  
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IV.   EXPORTS AND POVERTY 
Can developing countries “export their way out of poverty”, can they export their way 
to achievement of the MDGs? How can the poor in developing countries achieve 
productivity and the means to compete in the world market? How can governments 
ensure that the benefits of exports are widely shared and that they reduce inequalities? 
How can it be assured that export industries are sustainable, that adequate working 
conditions are maintained, that environmental impacts do not undermine the 
livelihoods of people in other sectors. What are the constraints faced by governments 
in promoting exports? What contribution can “aid for trade” programmes make to 
addressing “supply side” constraints which inhibit a country’s ability to export? 
Export Growth and the MDGs 
Increased exports of goods and  services can provide increased incomes for poor 
people, government revenue, new opportunities for employment, including high paid 
jobs abroad, particularly for women and young jobseekers. Exports can contribute to 
the achievement of MDGs by lifting people out of poverty (MDG1) and empowering 
women (MDG3), and by contributing to the achievement of MDG8. MDG8 aims at a 
trading system in which developing countries can extract greater benefits from the 
international trading system. 
Trade policies should be aimed at enabling poorer people to compete in the world 
market and derive benefits from globalization. The simple orthodoxy would suggest 
that trade liberalization will allow resources to be redeployed from low productivity 
to high productivity export sectors. However, it ignores the basic fact that there are 
already high levels of unemployment in developing countries. Human resources are 
available for the export sector, they do not have to be “liberated” by creating 
unemployment in other sectors.31 Import and export policy should be twin elements of 
an overall industrialization strategy, targeting the import of essential food, fuels, raw 
materials, inputs, capital equipment, machinery, spare parts and intermediate inputs 
goods, supporting export growth and earning the foreign exchange necessary to 
finance such imports. Priority should be given to the expansion of those  export 
sectors  that will provide opportunities for achieving the MDGs and other 
development goals. 
One problem is that many poorer developing countries have suffered a decline in their 
share in world exports, even when benefiting from tariff preferences which they now 
find eroding. Other countries have been able to rapidly increase exports in response to 
certain trade policy measures which have worked in their favour, but are finding 
themselves unable to compete when faced with a more open, competitive situation. 
One example is textiles and clothing, where many poorer countries have developed a 
successful export industry within the framework of the discriminatory structure of the 
Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA) and are now faced with the challenge of a more 
competitive environment as described in Annex A to this Section. Another example is 
the sugar sector where the erosion of EU preferences will cause inevitable adjustment 
costs to poor producers. 
 
                                                  
31 See Stiglitz, Joseph and Andrew Charlton, op. cit., p. 25-26.   
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Box 11: Aid-for-Trade  
The need for scaling up aid-for-trade resources to LDCs and other low income countries was 
widely recognized by the international community in 2005, culminating with the inclusion in 
the  December 2005 WTO Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration of key paragraphs on both an 
enhanced Integrated Framework
 for Trade Related Technical Assistance for the LDCs (IF) 
and broader aid-for-trade. Ministers in Hong Kong agreed to establish a new Aid-For-Trade 
Task Force with the mandate to provide recommendations on how to operationalize aid-for-
trade components beyond an enhanced IF, so that it can most effectively contribute to the 
development dimension of the Doha Round.  Following wide-ranging consultations with 
WTO member states, international agencies and other stakeholders, the Task Force submitted 
its report to the WTO General Council on 27 July 2006. The report, which was finalized after 
the suspension of the Doha negotiations, makes clear that aid-for-trade is a complement to the 
Doha Round and not conditional upon its success.  
The main thrust of the Task Force’s recommendations is that existing arrangements and 
commitments should be built upon in financing aid-for-trade needs, guided by the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. In this context, The WTO Director General is urged to 
“seek confirmation from donors and agencies that funds are readily available for the 
implementation of the aid-for-trade initiative …”.  
As for the scope of aid-for-trade, this should be broad enough to cover the diverse needs of 
developing countries, and clear enough to differentiate aid-for-trade from other development 
assistance (of which it is a part). Trade-related development priorities included in the 
recipients’ national development strategies should be considered as falling under the aid-for-
trade umbrella.  
Specifically, aid-for-trade  is expected to encompass  trade policy and regulations; trade 
development; trade-related infrastructure; building productive capacity; and trade-related 
adjustment.   
This is a broad enough definition to cover the wide array of supply side constraints affecting 
developing countries’ competitiveness on world markets, including i nvestments in projects 
addressing cross-country and regional impediments to trade development, such as regional 
transport corridors, standards, disease or pest issues  - areas that have traditionally been 
neglected and require a much higher priority than they have received so far.  
Another important area that is, quite innovatively, covered, even though there is no consensus 
on its inclusion, are short-term adjustment needs (i.e. fiscal loss of government revenue as a 
result of MFN tariff reduction, changes in terms of trade for net food importers, preference 
erosion through MFN or FTA tariff reductions,  or the elimination of special preferential 
arrangements). The costs of adaptation to the elimination of the quota system on textiles and 
clothing, (see Annex 3 A) and the implementation costs of trade agreements are also included 
in many definitions.  
The Task Force’s report also makes provision for  AFT reporting  requirements  - either as 
donor or recipient - in periodic trade policy reviews of WTO member states. A global 
periodic aid-for-trade review is also  recommended. This is to be convened by a monitoring 
body to be set up within the WTO. The Director-General is expected to establish an ad hoc 
consultative group to take forward the practical follow up of the  Task Force’s 
recommendations. 
Source: UNDP Concept Note on  Aid for Trade, January 2006 (http://www.undp.org/poverty/)  and 
WTO document “Recommendations of the Task Force on Aid For Trade”, WT/AFT/1, 27 July 2006 
(www.wto.org). 
Export growth is part of the virtuous spiral described in Section  3, providing 
financing for the import of new technologies needed to increase competitiveness and 
improve living standards.   
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Increase Productivity 
Exports should, directly or indirectly, provide employment for poor people and 
women. The challenge is to provide them with the means to compete and to increase 
their  productivity. This requires an understanding of factors contributing to 
competitiveness in the sector, and policy measures to enhance them. Some countries 
have achieved high export growth but with low value added since such exports have 
not emerged from the industrialization strategy described in Section  3. The move 
from static to dynamic comparative advantage is manifested in the continuous 
upgrading of the technological content of exports, which is the expected result of 
moving up the virtuous spiral described in Section  3. Success in exporting is a 
function of the capacity to domestically produce products that are “dynamic in world 
trade”.
32 
Box 12: China’s Industrialization 
China has followed an approach to industrialization which is similar, in important respects, to 
that which was adopted by the Republic of Korea. Both have high technological content and 
value-added  in the domestic economy, as described in Section  3. Tariff and quota protection 
and TRIMs were used as “carrots and sticks” to oblige firms to move up the technological 
ladder. China’s impressive export performance has been a result of its ability to produce 
“dynamic” export products of ever increasing technological content. China’s pattern of 
production and exports were not left to be determined by traditional forces of comparative 
advantage. Government policies have nurtured domestic capabilities in consumer electronics 
and other advanced technology products.
33  
Promote equity 
In most cases, even when they have occurred, the benefits of impressive export gains 
have not always been widely shared . In certain circumstances, exports have even 
undermined the livelihoods of poor people. Policies to increase exports should  be 
mindful of equity concerns, ensuring that benefits of exports do not accrue mainly to 
richer segments of the population. Additional measures are necessary to ensure that 
poorer segments of the population derive direct gains from export expansion, rather 
than rely only on trickle-down benefits. Evidence shows that export growth built on 
an inequitable distribution of income, can simply exacerbate existing inequalities.
34 
 
Box 13: Equity Issues in Fisheries Sector 
The f isheries sector is a good example where a successful export industry can actually 
undermine the livelihoods of poorer producers, unless a strict policy framework is imposed to 
protect the latter, as described in Annex B to this Paper. The main exporters are large fishing 
fleets which deplete the coastal water and thus reduce availability to small fishers. Similarly 
the great success of aquaculture exports has resulted in the saline pollution of agricultural 
lands. 
                                                  
32 For a list of dynamic products in  world trade and an analysis of their contribution to export 
performance, see UNCTAD World Investment Report 2002 (www.unctad.org). 
33 See Rodrik, Dani, What is so Special about China’s Exports?, Centre for Economic Policy Research 
(London, February 2006) (www.cepr.org). 
34 See UNDP Human Development Report 2005, International Cooperation at a Crossroads: Aid, Trade 
and Security in an Unequal World,  Chapter 4  (New York, 2005) 
(http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005/).  
  30 
Ensure sustainability 
Export polices should also ensure that exports are sustainable in the sense that current 
gains do  not prevent subsequent generations from improving their own welfare. The 
concept of sustainability  encompasses environmental concerns, as well as human 
capabilities such as health and education. Export industries may damage the 
environment, exhausting resources and otherwise serving to undermine the 
livelihoods of people employed in other sectors. Employment opportunities may 
entail unhealthy and dangerous working conditions,  resulting in workers not being 
able to sustain more than a few years employment in the export industries. Hence, 
export orientation should be  part of a comprehensive development strategy that 
incorporates measures to ensure that these human development objectives are 
attained. 
Elements of a Comprehensive pro -Poor Export Strategy 
These should comprise the following: 
(a)  improving the infrastructure supporting export activities of small and poor 
producers, including access to credit and to land; 
(b)  providing them with access to training and technology to improve skills; 
(c)  assisting them in raising the quality of the goods and services they produce, to 
meet SPS, TBT and buyer preferences; 
(d)  ensuring adequate working conditions, health and safety standards; 
(e)  Obtaining freer and more secure access to markets for their products, 
(f)  Liberalization of trade in services should be targeted to sectors where 
investment supports the competitiveness of the export sectors, and should be 
subject to condition that enhance this positive contribution; 
(g)   Strengthening community participation in export benefits through such 
techniques as the protection and application of traditional knowledge and the 
encouragement and protection of geographical indications;  
(h)  Strengthening positive linkages with other sectors of the economy, and dealing 
with negative externalities, e.g. working conditions, environmental 
degradation;  
(i)  Facilitating the temporary movement of persons abroad to gain skills and 
foreign exchange.  
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Box 14: Export Policies and WTO and other Trade Agreements 
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (Article 27.2(a)) exempts LDCs 
from the prohibition on export subsidies. The same exemption is also provided to a list of 
countries (in Annex VII) as long as their per capita GDP remains  below $1000. Note that 
some acceding countries have forsaken this right in their terms of accession to the WTO. The 
Agreement on Agriculture permits countries to subsidize exports up to the level of their 
negotiated commitments. Very few developing countries have negotiated such commitments, 
and thus cannot subsidize.  
The TRIMs Agreement prohibits trade balancing requirements, i.e. that investing firms must 
export to the extent they import. However, it does permit export performance and transfer of 
technology requirements. The GATS Agreement permits performance requirements for 
developing countries in order to help strengthen services in developing countries and it has no 
effective disciplines on export subsidies. 
However, m any countries have given up the r ight to these and other performance 
requirements in their terms of accession or in bilateral agreements (BITs and FTAs).  
Access to Export Markets 
Export-led development strategies obviously require the most free and secure access 
to world markets possible. For several decades developing countries have enjoyed 
preferential access to developed countries’ markets under the Generalized System of 
Preferences negotiated in UNCTAD. These had the advantage of being non-
reciprocal, but the serious disadvantages of not being bound and thus insecure, and of 
containing many exceptions, precisely in sectors, (e.g.  textiles and  clothing  and 
agriculture) where developing countries possess a comparative advantage. Some 
poorer developing countries, notably  those in the  ACP group, benefited from 
contractual preferences in the EU. Most developed countries (excluding the USA) 
have complied with their commitment to extend duty free treatment to LDCs. Other 
developing countries are granted autonomous preferences to assist them i n dealing 
with specific problems, such as dependence on exports of illicit drugs. 
Many developing countries are seeking to negotiate FTAs with major developed 
countries as a means of ensuring conditions of access equal to those of their 
competitors. Negotiations have already begun to convert ACP preferences into 
reciprocal FTAs (“Economic Partnership Agreements”). 
However, barriers and distortions to world trade, particularly subsidized agricultural 
production and exports in the industrialized countries, ha ve heavily penalized many 
developing countries. Contingent measures such as anti-dumping duties have served 
to “nip in the bud” export expansion in developing countries, while stricter sanitary 
and technical regulations have also had a disproportionate imp act on poor people, 
excluding them from export income. Stringent rules of origin have resulted in many 
exports not benefiting from available tariff preferences. Poorer people are much more 
adversely affected by insecure access to markets, as sudden disruptions to their 
exports can provoke immediate unemployment in export industries and bankrupt 
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Box 15: Catfish, Globalization and the Poor 
Many poor communities have invested in aquaculture production in the Mekong Delta of Viet 
Nam. Exports of catfish were having impressive success in the United States market and 
became a model of how globalization can benefit the poor. However, protectionist groups in 
the United States launched a policy of trade harassment against Vietnamese catfish, first by 
attempting to portray the catfish as being produced in unsanitary conditions, a claim which 
was debunked by the US Department of Agriculture, then by obtaining legislation requiring 
the Vietnamese product to be sold as “basa” and “tra” rather than “catfish”. When this 
measure had little effect on imports, anti-dumping action was taken, facilitated by Viet Nam’s 
“non-market economy” status in United States law, and the fact that, as a non-member of 
WTO at that  time , Viet Nam had no multilateral rights and no access to dispute settlement 
mechanisms.
35 
V.  AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY 
 
Agriculture and the MDGs 
The large majority of people living in extreme poverty  live in rural areas of 
developing countries. Most of them are engaged in the subsistence agricultural sector. 
In some poor countries, agriculture constitutes up to 80 per cent of the labour force. 
Thus, the achievement of MDG1, MDG 3  (e.g. in some countries women do over 60 
per cent of cultivation work) and others in most developing countries will depend on 
the success of reforms aimed at  providing higher standards of living in the 
agricultural sector. Trade policy is an essential component of any such reforms. These 
millions of poor people are extremely vulnerable; their livelihoods can  be suddenly 
undermined by surges in imports of cheap agricultural products. Trade can provide 
opportunities for the poor, if their products are able to penetrate lucrative export 
markets. Success in policies to raise poor farmers’ incomes  at the national level will 
be directly linked to the direction taken in the ongoing process of reform of the 
international trade regime governing agricultural trade. Developing countries are 
actively participating in the current WTO negotiations with the objective of designing 
an international regime more coincident with development objectives. At the same 
time many are further liberalizing trade in agricultural products within the framework 
of FTAs.  
Complex Multilateral Regime  
Trade in the agricultural sector is subject  to a multilateral regime of extreme 
complexity. The process of “tariffication” conducted in the Uruguay Round under 
which non-tariff measures (e.g. quantitative restrictions) and variable levies were 
converted into equivalent tariff rates (and all tariff rates were bound) resulted in very 
high MFN tariffs in most major importing countries.36 Market access (at least 5 
                                                  
35 See Lam Quoc Tuan, “Trade in Fisheries and Human Development - Country Case Study -Vietnam ”, 
UNDP Asia Trade Initiative on Trade and Human Development, Phase 1, technical support document 
(Hanoi: 2003) (available at www.undprcc.lk/Publications/Publications.asp?C=4). 
36 An exception to the prohibition of QRs on Agricultural products is contained in Annex 5 to the 
Agreement on Agriculture .Section B in that Annex enables developing countries to maintain QRs on  
  33 
percent of domestic consumption) was provided by a system of tariff rate quotas 
(TRQs),
37 at lower, but usually positive rates, often allocated to individual suppliers. 
As the out of quota tariffs are usually prohibitively high, imports of a large number of 
agricultural products into developed countries are in fact subject to de facto 
quantitative limits. This protective regime is supplemented by  a Special Safeguard 
Mechanism (SSM), which permits additional import charges to be applied when 
imports of “tariffied” products exceed trigger prices or trigger volumes.  
Thus, the new regime retained, in a somewhat different form, the quantitative 
restrictions (de facto) and variable levies that were central to the EU protective 
regime. It also established a framework for “micro -negotiation” for the granting of 
bilateral quotas reminiscent of the MFA. Within such a structure, analysis based on 
average tariff rates provides little useful guidance for policy makers.
38 
The WTO Agriculture Agreement also imposed some discipline on agricultural 
subsides. Export subsidies are subject to sectoral commitments, (volume and 
payments). Domestic production subsidies designed  to have a distorting effect, (e.g.. 
price supports), are also subject to overall negotiated ceilings (based on AMS-
aggregate measure of support) with a de minimis exception (5 per cent for developed, 
10  per cent  for developing countries). Two other categories of subsidies  are not 
subject to limitations: (i) direct payments to producers when linked to supply 
reduction (“blue” box), and (ii) those determined to have minimal trade impact 
(“green” box). This structure has not served to limit agricultural subsidization, which 
has increased to almost $300 billion annually. Subsidy programmes have simply been 
directed to those ‘boxes” where no limits are applied. 39 
Bound limits of domestic production subsidies (AMS) total $64 billion.  However 
actual subsidization does not reach these limits. The utilization rate was 88 per cent in 
USA, 62 per cent in EU and 17 per cent in Japan.40 Twenty nine WTO members have 
made AMS commitments. They are phrased in terms of overall payments, e.g. the 
European Community’s commitment is EUR 67 billion, that of the United States $19 
billion. 
                                                                                                                                                
“a primary agricultural product that is the predominant staple in the traditional diet of a developing 
country”. Only Korea, the Philippines and Israel make use of this provision 
37 In practice not all countries have met the 5 per cent access commitment and the TRQs have been 
significantly under utilized. 
38 S tiglitz and Charlton, op. cit., pp. 217-234. 
39 There is a concise description of the  subsidy boxes on the WTO website  at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agboxes_e.htm. 
40 See presentation by Ralf Peters UNCTAD at UNECA Ad Hoc Meeting on Agriculture, Tunis, 
November 2004, http://www.uneca.og/eca_programes/trade.  
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Box 16: Legal and Political Initiatives - Example of Cotton 
Trade negotiations are not the only way of addressing the export interests of the poor in 
international trade. The WTO dispute settlement mechanism enables developing countries to 
challenge measures that are inconsistent with multilateral obligations. One  example is the 
successful case launched by Brazil, with the support of  numerous developing countries, 
against many elements of the United States subsidy schemes on cotton. The United States was 
found to have subsidized exports of cotton at a level exceeding its WTO commitments and in 
breach of other provisions of the Agreements on Agriculture  and on Subsid ies and 
Countervailing Measures (such as favouring the use of domestic over imported cotton).
41 
In parallel to this case, four poor African countries - Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali, 
introduced a “Sectoral Initiative in Favour of Cotton”
42 which described the damage caused to 
their poor cotton producers by the lavish subsidies offered to rich cotton producers in 
developed countries. The objective was to shame the major trading countries into taking 
action to eliminate these subsidies. 
The initiative by Brazil was instrumental in dealing with United States export subsidies. As 
LDCs, these four countries should benefit from duty free treatment into all developed 
markets, however, the major issue of achieving the accelerated reduction of domestic 
production subsidies on cotton  is still being pursued in the resumed Doha Round.Disputes 
against subsidies in the agricultural sector will likely proliferate with the expiry of the “peace 
clause”.
43 
Further Agricultural Liberalization 
The logic of the Uruguay Round was to ensure minimum access to markets, while 
placing ceilings on protection and subsidization, as a starting point for further 
agricultural liberalization in future multilateral rounds. For developing countries, 
however, this process, served to “lock in” World Bank structural adjustment 
programmes, resulting in an asymmetrical system that penalized developing 
countries, as they were not permitted to increase their existing levels of subsidies and 
tariff protection. Countries acceding to the WTO found themselves obliged to accept 
even more stringent conditions. Developing countries found themselves in a situation 
in which their markets became relatively open to imports (all agricultural tariffs were 
bound), even when such imports benefited from export subsidies in OECD countries, 
while  their exports were restricted by restrictive tariff quotas and met subsidized 
competition from developed country competitors in third country markets. Overall, 
developing countries, once net exporters of agricultural products, have become net 
importers with a deficit of $11 billion in 2001. The major subsidizing developed 
countries, the EU and the United States, have gained at the expense of most 
                                                  
41 See “United States  – Upland Cotton”, WTO Dispute DS267, Appellate Body Report, circulated 3 
March 2005 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds267_e.htm  
42  See  WTO document,  Committee on Agriculture  - Special Session  -WTO Negotiations on 
Agriculture, “Poverty Reduction: Sectoral Initiative in Favour of Cotton” - Joint Proposal Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali, TN/AG/GEN/4, 16 May 2003 www.wto.org. 
43 Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. For an up-to-date analysis of current issues in the 
multilateral negotiations on agriculture at the time of their suspension see Blandford, David and Tim 
Josling, “Options for the WTO Modalities for Agriculture”, International Food and Agricultural Trade 
Policy Council, May 2006, 
http://www.agritrade.org/Publications/DiscussionPapers/WTO%20Modalities.pdf     
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developing  countries with a few notable exceptions, such as India and the most 
competitive southern hemisphere exporters (e.g. Argentina and Brazil).
44 For the net 
food importing developing countries (NFIDCs), taken as a group, imports represent 
35 per cent of calorie intake. Paradoxically, those countries most dependent on 
agricultural exports witness higher levels of malnutrition.
45 
National trade policies must be designed to reflect the complexities of the agricultural 
sector in most developing countries. Some countries have been very successful in the 
export of widely traded agricultural commodities. However, in many cases small scale 
farmers have not benefited, production of export crops has resulted in the 
displacement of small scale farmers and exacerbated their plight by contributing to 
environmental degradation posing an overall threat to food security. Large segments 
of the population are small scale farmers whose livelihood can be suddenly eroded by 
imports of cheap, often subsidized imports. Countries have adopted both “offensive” 
and “defensive” strategies. On the one hand, they have pursued improved access to 
markets, and on the other hand, have sought to ensure protection of vulnerable 
segments of their populations.
46  
Developing counties are seeking an international regime that reflects these 
complexities, as well as the varying, often conflicting interests of different developing 
countries. They are seeking better market access and the reduction of subsidization by 
the developed countries, for example through the elimination of export subsidies, the 
drastic reduction in amber box commitments, capping and phasing out ”blue box” 
limits , and imposing some meaningful disciplines on “green box” subsidies. Many 
argue that the reduction of agricultural support in OECD countries would be the most 
significant pro-poor result of the Doha Round. The refusal of the United States to 
accept limits on its total trade distorting subsidization (amber plus blue box plus de 
minimis), which are lower than its actual levels of subsidization, has been given as the 
main reason behind the suspension of the multilateral negotiations in July 2006.
47 The 
resumed negotiations are aimed at achieving a breakthrough on subsidies combined 
with liberalization of tariffs and tariff quotas and agreement on Special Products and a 
Special Safeguard Mechanism (see below). 
Other areas of the international trade regime, which can affect the interests of small 
farmers, include notably sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) regulations, liberalization 
of distribution services (see Section 6) and intellectual property rights. 
                                                  
44 See Stiglitz and Charlton, op. cit., pp 217-234, notably table AI.3.  
45 Pal, op. cit. 
46 See for example  Rahman, Abdul Aziz,  “Trade in Agriculture, Food Security and Human 
Development: Country Case Study for Malaysia”, UNDP Asia Trade Initiative on Trade and Human 
Development, Phase 1, technical support document (Hanoi: 2003) (available at 
www.undprcc.lk/Publications/Publications.asp?C=4).  
47 See the statement by the EC Agriculture Commissioner, Mariann Fisher Boel, following the 
suspension of the WTO Doha Round negotiations: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/fischer-
boel/doha/index_en.htm#2407.  The United States, on the other hand, claims that the proposals of the 
G33 on SP would effectively block meaningful access to their markets for US agricultural exports.   
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Liberalization and Food Security  
A key coalition of developing countries, the G3348 are seeking to make any further 
liberalization in agricultural trade conditional upon the preservation of their policy 
space to intervene to protect livelihoods, and ensure food security. This approach has 
been manifested in the Special Products
49 and Special Safeguards proposals currently 
before the WTO. While it is recognized that such measure could increase import 
prices of foodstuffs for urban consumers, on balance rural producers are the p oorest 
members of society in developing countries, far poorer than those segments of the 
population who purchase imported food.
50 
Box 17: Identifying Special Products 
Criteria: The Special Products (SP) proposal aims at ensuring that future commitments on 
market access for agriculture will permit a special degree of flexibility for products central to 
the objectives of (a) food security (all people have physical and economic access to sufficient 
safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs for an active and healthy life), (b) 
livelihood security (adequate and sustainable access to resources or assets by household and 
individuals to realize a minimum standard of living, recognizing that poor farmers have very 
low risk thresholds) and (c) rural development (the potential of an agricultural product to 
improve the living standards of the rural population including both directly and through its 
forward linkages to non-farm rural activities).
51 
The question of the criteria to be used in determining which products are “spec ial” is the 
subject of current debate in the WTO and is also relevant to developing countries in their 
national agricultural trade policies. Basic indicators that should be examined include:  
-  Food security: the share of consumption of the product in total agricultural consumption, 
and the share of its domestic production in domestic consumption. These could be used as 
indicators of the importance o f the product for food security.  A certain percentage of 
domestic consumption of the basic food basket should b e met by domestic production, 
since dependence on imports create high vulnerability for products for which world trade 
volume is relatively small compared to world demand; 
-  Livelihood security: the share of employment as a result of production of the product in 
the total agricultural labour force; if the majority of farmers producing a particular 
product are low income, and resource poor, any disruption caused by imports can cause 
deprivation and even starvation; 
-  Rural development: the share of production of the product in total agricultural 
production. This could serve as an indicator of the contribution of the product to rural 
development.
52  
                                                  
48 G33 members are: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Botswana, China, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Cuba, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, 
Korea, Mauritius, Madagascar, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, 
Philippines, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Suriname, 
Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
49 According to the terminology used in the WTO, “sensitive” products are those for which developed 
countries are seeking less than formula liberalization.  
50  See Stiglitz and Charlton op. cit p. 230 
51  See Proposal of G33 on the modalities for the designation and treatment of any agricultural product 
as a  Special P roduct (SP) by any developing country member, JOB(05)304, 2 2  November 2005 
http://www.agtradepolicy.org/output/resource/G33_proposal_SPs_22Nov05.pdf.  
52 FAO Support to the WTO Negotiations (2003), www.fao.org.docrep/005.  
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Different products emerge at the top of the potential SP list when the criteria are applied in 
different countries, e.g. maize in Ethiopia, yams in Cote d’Ívoire, cassava in Nigeria and rice 
in Bangladesh
53.  
These “macro” indicators should be supplemented by the additional factors listed below, to 
address the needs of the main target group, the rural poor, including women and small 
farmers.  
-  Geographical concentration of production and employment within the country, (for 
example, it has been possible to draw a food insecurity map of India
54), with a focus on 
particularly disadvantaged regions. This should also be examined.
55 
-  Household incomes and production capacity of small farmers. 
-  The potential that locally produced products could be displaced by substitute products, 
not produced in the country concerned.  
-  Caloric intake: Share of product at national or regional levels. 
-  Expenditures: Share of income spent on a particular product at the national or regional 
levels.  
External factors should also be considered, including: 
•  Import Penetration, of identified products and directly competing products,  
•  Financial capacity of the country to finance food security programmes, 
•  Subsidization, the extent to which a product benefits from export or production 
subsidies in supplying countries. 
 
Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) would provide developing countries with a 
facility comparable to those already available to “tariffied” products to deal with 
sudden surges. Additional duties could be imposed on imports “triggered” by 
increased import volumes or declining import prices.
56 It should be noted that the 
agricultural tariff profiles of the  proponents of SSM vary considerably. The bound 
tariff rates of  some members of G33 well exceed  100 per cent, which provides 
adequate margin at present to deal with import surges.
57 
                                                  
53 Ibid. 
54 See Pal, Parthapratim, The Ongoing Negotiations on Agriculture: Some Observations, presentation at 
the Workshop on “WTO-Related Issues for Government Officials in the SAARC Region”, The Energy 
and Resources Institute (TERI), 1 -3 May 2006, New Delhi, India  
http://www.teriin.org/events/docs/wtopresent/partha4.ppt.  
55 This discussion draws heavily from the paper by Bernal, Luisa, “Methodology for the Identification 
of Special Products and Products for Eligibility Under Special Safeguard Mechanism by Developing 
Countries”, ITCSD (Geneva, October 2005)  http://www.ictsd.org/dlogue/2005-10-
14/Luisa%20Bernal%20Methodlogy%20paper.pdf . 
56 See proposal of the G33  Proposal  on SSM for developing countries, JOB(06)64, 23 March 2006, 
available at: http://www.agtradepolicy.org/output/resource/G33_revised_proposal_SSM_23Mar06.pdf   
57 For an analysis of the bound tariff rates of G33 countries and their ability to respond to import 
surges, see Jales, Mario, “Tariff Reduction, Special Products and Special Safeguards: An Analysis of 
the Agricultural Tariff Structures of G33 countries ”,  ICTSD Geneva, June 2005 
http://www.ictsd.org/dlogue/2005-06-16/Jales.pdf.   
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Box 18: Applying Special Safeguards 
Article 5 of the WTO Agreement in agriculture institutes a system of Special Safeguards 
(SSG) under which countries can apply additional charges to imports based on trigger 
volumes or trigger prices. This facility is available only for items which have been “tariffied” 
and have been designated for SSG by the country concerned. While some 21 developing 
countries have been able to make use of this facility it has been used overwhelmingly by 
developed countries. 
Agricultural markets are by nature cyclical and are affected by natural factors such a s 
weather. To this is added the man-made factors of subsidization and the behaviour of trading 
firms. The food price index has actually become more volatile since  the WTO’s 
establishment.
58.As a consequence of massive subsidization in the United States and  the 
European Union, export prices of key food commodities are below the costs of production, 
for example wheat (by 43%), rice (by 35%) and maize (by 13%).
59 
The further reduction of bound tariff rates on agricultural imports could expose vulnerable 
producers in developing countries to severe external shocks that could drastically affect their 
livelihoods.
60 It was confirmed at the sixth WTO Ministerial Conference that developing 
countries should have access to a Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) which would b e used 
to shield vulnerable producers from surges of low priced imports. The SSM would be 
activated by trigger volumes and prices. The G33 proposed that the trigger price would be the 
average monthly price of that product, and the trigger volume would equal the average annual 
volume, for the most recent three year period. The SSM would apply to all products and all 
trade including that under FTAs. The specifics of the proposal are yet to be agreed. 
Defining the indicators for these special protective measures is a crucial element in 
both national trade policies and in the ongoing multilateral trade negotiations, as well 
as in FTAs. The SP criteria and SSG mechanisms should be incorporated into national 
regulations so as to provide the basis for their inclusion in the WTO agreement and 
any FTAs.  
SPS regulations present a serious barrier to exports of agricultural products, 
particularly  those of small scale farmers. Improvement in the implementation of the 
WTO SPS regime is being sought in the Doha Round. The aim is both giving more 
time to developing countries to adjust to new regulations, and seeking a commitment 
on the part of the importing country to provide the technical and financial assistance 
necessary to permit the developing country to meet the standards. This should also be 
a priority in any Aid for Trade programme. 
Agricultural products have proven a complex issue in the negotiation of FTAs. In 
some cases, North South FTAs have excluded major export products of interest to the 
developing partner  (rice, sugar), while failing to impose any disciplines on the 
subsidization provided by the developed partner (although agreements not to apply 
export subsidies to mutual trade have been included in some FTAs) FTAs often 
preclude the possibility of excluding “Special Products”. While some FTAs include 
                                                  
58 Pal, op. cit., and Paz, Julio, “Identificación de Productos Especiales y Mecanismos de Salvaguardia 
Especial en el Peru”, ICTSD, Geneva 2005. 
59 IATP  
60 See Hathaway, Dale, “A Special Agricultural Safeguard: buttressing the market access reforms of 
developing countries”, comments in FAO Papers on Selected Issues Relating to the WTO Negotiations 
on Agriculture, FAO, Rome 2002 (http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/Y3733E/y3733e05.htm).  
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safeguard measures on agricultural imports, these are often to be removed at the end 
of the phase  - in period of the FTA.  Paradoxically, some FTAs among developing 
countries target selected agricultural products for an “early harvest”, while other 
agricultural  products have been placed on sensitive or excluded lists. The various 
considerations involved in the “FTA option” are examined in Section X. 
Gender and Agricultural Trade 
The gender aspects of agricultural production are particularly complex, and therefore 
the effects of various agreements on the employment of women in the agricultural 
sector are also complex. Men and women in developing countries have different roles: 
the majority of women are engaged in subsistence agriculture and are responsible for 
food security in the household, while men are concentrated in the sector producing 
export crops. The liberalization of imports of agricultural products tends to 
disadvantage women producing subsistence food.61  
In summary, pro-poor policy positions in negotiations on trade in agriculture should, 
at a minimum, include:  
(a) acceleration of agreed elimination of export subsidies, 
(b) substantial reduction in trade distorting subsidies ( amber and blue boxes), 
(c) reduction in tariffs and increase in TRQs in markets of developed countries, 
(d) right to SP for developing countries, 
(e) rights to SSM for developing countries, 
(f)  technical and financial assistance to meet SPS regulations 
                                                  
61  See  UNCTAD,  “Trade and Gender: Opportunities, Challenges and the Policy Dimension”, 
UNCTAD/TD/392, 2004, para. 25 (http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/edm20042_en.pdf).  
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VI.   TRADE IN SERVICES 
AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES 
Trade in services, as defined in the GATS covers a wide range of policy areas, 
including investment, communications, transportation, finance, energy, environment, 
health,  immigration and many others. Government policies to develop the services 
sector are essential to the attainment of the MDGs. Governments are now faced with 
the challenge of formulating domestic policies in the services sector which  provide 
universal access for key social services, while faced with pressures to accept bound 
liberalization commitments  in trade agreements. T he services sector  should 
simultaneously support efficiency and growth, and increase  developing country 
participation in the world market for services. 
Services and the MDGs 
The provision of universal access to key services such as health, water and sanitation, 
energy and education is central to the achievement of the MDGs. Ill health, poor 
education and lack of access to electricity lock millions of people in a poverty trap.  
Access to these services enables poor people to become productive member of the 
economy and society and reduces rural/urban and gender disparities. The 
strengthening of national services sectors and the creation of an efficient services 
infrastructure, contributes to the productivity of other sectors and  to international 
competitiveness.  Trade in services can assist in the attainment of the MDGs by 
providing new and better employment opportunities, particularly for new job seekers, 
including women, by contributing to the productivity of poorer people, in both the 
agricultural and manufacturing sectors, and by facilitating access of domestic service 
providers to more lucrative world markets. The main objectives of a national services 
policy are thus, (a) to provide universal coverage for basic services such as health,  
water, sanitation, education and energy, (b) to  strengthen the services infrastructure of 
the country to improve the competitiveness of the national economy, and (c) to 
pen etrate international markets for trade in services.  
Universal Access to Services 
Many social and infrastructural services in developing countries have traditionally 
been under public ownership. A priority development objective has been to ensure 
universal access to key services, notably health, water and sanitation, education and, 
energy. For various reasons, including lack of ability to pay, geographical isolation or 
ethnic and gender factors, poor people have been excluded from access to the most 
basic services necessary to maintain their health, and to enable them to be productive 
members of  the national economy.  Governments have  attempted to make basic 
services affordable to poor people by subsidizing free medical and education services, 
cross-subsidized prices for electricity,  and  investment incentives for sanitation and 
energy production in isolated areas. In some cases, the pressing need for capital and 
technology to increase supply has led governments to open up public services to 
private ownership, including the participation of foreign suppliers. This has brought 
these service  sectors within the scope of trade negotiations
62. The  entry of foreign 
                                                  
62 The implications of GATS negotiations in traditional public service sectors are discussed in Adlung, 
Rolf, Public Services and the GATS, WTO Working Paper, ERSD -2005-03, Geneva, July 2005, 
http://www.wto.org/English/res_e/reser_e/ersd200503_e.htm.   
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suppliers in the  domestic market for  key social services can often exacerbate 
inequalities and undermine policies aimed at ensuring universal access,  for example, 
by draining off professionals (doctors, nurses, teachers) for the public system and 
exacerbating urban/rural disparities.  
Services and Competitiveness  
Services policies empower and enhance the productivity of poor people by (a) 
through the provision of advanced services as inputs into the productive process at all 
levels, and (b) by  facilitating the export of services. Despite the heterogeneity of the 
service sector, governments should aim at devising an overall services development 
strategy that provides policy measures applicable to all services sectors. S uch  a 
strategy must address imports under “Mode 3” i.e. the conditions imposed on foreign 
investment in service sectors. Priority should be given to ensuring access to those key 
producer services that contribute to the competitiveness of other services, or of the 
manufacturing sector. The Annexes to this Section illustrate some of the 
considerations facing developing countries in negotiations on trade in selected service 
sectors where developing countries are faced with requests for liberalization 
commitments. 
In services liberalization, priority should be given to services that serve as inputs into 
the productive process and, enhance productivity. Service strategies should ensure 
that imports do not exacerbate inequalities by reducing access to essential services, 
crowding out small suppliers or by giving control of key sectors to large TNCs. 
Liberalization of services with no productive role, but with a possible negative impact 
on social programmes, national sovereignty or cultural integrity should be avoided as 
far as possible. 
Exports of Services  
On the other hand, developing countries are major exporters of certain services, 
notably in areas where they posses a labour cost advantage, (comparable to  textiles 
and clothing). S uch exports usually involve the movement of persons as (a) 
consumers, e.g. tourism, (Mode 2) and (b) suppliers, movement of workers abroad 
(Mode 4). More recently some developing countries are exporting labour intensive 
services electronically (Mode1), a p rocess which has been termed 
“outsourcing”.Often, however, developing countries’ exports of  such services, where 
they can expect to have a comparative advantage (e.g. construction), are frustrated by 
lack of access to capital  and constraints on the short-term movement of semi-skilled 
labour. Also restrictive business practices, such as those prevalent in the tourism 
sector, can greatly reduce the actual benefit of exports to the exporting developing 
country.  Success in these areas requires a coherent strategy on the part of the 
developing countries, as well as secure access to markets (see Annex E to this 
Section) accompanied where relevant by sector specific provisions to deal with anti-
competitive practices. 
Negotiations on Trade in Services 
 The WTO GATS  Agreement established a framework for the negotiation of 
multilateral commitments relating to trade in services, which were defined a s 
covering four Modes of Supply (Mode 1 - cross border movement, Mode 2-movement 
of consumers,  Mode 3   -  commercial presence  i.e. investment, and  Mode 4   - 
temporary  movement of persons to supply services). GATS members accept the  
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principle of progressive liberalization, but also that commitments should aim at 
strengthening the service sectors of developing countries through access to 
technology and to distribution channels and information networks as well as the 
liberalization of services of export interest to them. The GATS itself does not impose 
access commitments and these are to be negotiated in successive “rounds”. However, 
the current GATS negotiations seem aimed at reaching agreement on a formula 
approach, requiring a certain degree of commitment from all participating countries. 
Developing countries have all made commitments in their WTO Service Schedules, 
and are in the process of negotiating further “progressive liberalization” in the Doha 
Round. FTAs include much more extensive commitments in services, often according 
to a structure and  based on definitions that depart from GATS. 
A Strong Regulatory Framework is Required 
Trade in services is normally subject to detailed regulation. Some of the “tools” for 
such regulation are the subject of negotiation in GATS, (as set out in GATS Article 
XVI), and include limitations on the number of suppliers, or service operations, or the 
numbers of persons employed in the supply of services, or on the value of service 
assets or transactions, usually enforced by economic need tests, as well as measures 
which require specific types of legal entities or limit the participation of foreign 
capital. In most sectors, the focus of negotiations is on investment measures. In 
particular, there is no obligation under the GATS Agreement to grant national 
treatment to foreign suppliers. Rather, the national treatment of foreign firms is a 
subject for negotiations on a sectoral basis. It does not constitute a “right” for foreign 
firms. Governments are free to regulate services so long as these regulations do not 
constitute “unnecessary barriers to trade” in services.  Regulations that apply equally 
to  domestic and foreign suppliers would be in conformity with national treatment 
commitments. On the other hand, where commitments are made on commercial 
presence, and the cross border movement of capital is an essential part of the service 
itself, members are committed to allow such movement of capital.63 
Performance requirements aimed at strengthening the service sectors in developing 
countries by acquiring access to technology or to distribution channels and 
information networks are specifically permitted by GATS. In their negotiations for the 
further liberalization of services, developing countries should focus on the extent to 
which imports of services effectively contribute to development. Liberalization of 
trade in services can have a positive impact on t he development of the national 
services sector so long as there is a strong  prior regulatory framework in place that 
supports national policy objectives. It is thus essential that the domestic regulations 
for the use of such imports be in place before engaging in negotiations on trade in 
services. 
In addition, other measures  that  affect trade in services such as qualification 
requirements and procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements  are 
subject to the general provision that such requirements should not constitute 
unnecessary barriers to trade in services. WTO members should be encouraged to 
enter into mutual recognition arrangements to overcome problems of this nature.  
                                                  
63 See footnote 2 to GATS Article XVI.  
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Investment Policy is Central to Trade Negotiations on Services  
In essence, the main thrust of the GATS negotiations is investment, with the 
developed countries as demandeurs. Thus, this section should be read in juxtaposition 
with Section  7. GATS provides a structure in which an optimum middle way can be 
negotiated in which  foreign investors are granted access to markets subject to 
development related conditions which are inscribed in the GATS schedules. Neither 
the liberalization of export markets, nor liberalization of trade and investment in 
services, will necessarily improve the situation of the poor in developing countries 
without supportive policy measures by governments. 
Requests to developing countries for liberalization of trade in services usually focus 
on Mode 3 commercial presence/investment. The challenge facing d eveloping 
countries is to negotiate the optimum conditions of access for such investment. The 
situation in several selected sectors is described in relevant annexes.  
The process of the proliferation of FTAs has covered trade in services and subjected 
services to more stringent disciplines at the bilateral or sub-regional levels. In some 
cases, definitions have departed from those used in GATS. The use of negative lists 
and the inclusion of GATS Mode 3 measures in “Investment” chapters covering both 
goods and services , are more than mere questions of form and can have an adverse 
developmental  impact, as they can eliminate the possibility of conditioning access on 
the acceptance of development oriented performance requirements or social 
obligations. 
 
VII.  INVESTMENT, JOBS FOR YOUTH 
AND ACCESS TO TECHNOLOGIES 
Developing countries are actively seeking FDI as a means of acquiring capital and 
technology and providing employment and export opportunities. Many governments 
wish to maintain an investment regime which, while attractive to investors, protects 
the national interest  against potential adverse effects, such as crowding out of 
domestic producers and exacerbating inequalities. Such a regime should also channel 
investment toward development objectives. Investment m easures, including 
incentives and performance requirements, are used to integrate FDI into development 
strategies, for example by assuring a transfer of technology and higher level 
employment for nationals, particularly young people (consistent with MDG targets 16 
and 18). However, developing countries are increasingly faced with requests to accept 
commitments in trade agreements that would further reduce the scope for investment 
policy.  
International Commitments on Investment Policy 
The efforts of some developed countries to include the negotiation of a Multilateral 
Framework for Investment in the Doha Round were unsuccessful.
64 However, the 
ongoing GATS negotiations are primarily aimed at reducing conditions on FDI. These 
“Mode 3” negotiations are currently underway as discussed in Section  VI and their 
objective is to agree on further limitations on investment policy in services. GATS 
                                                  
64 As were similar efforts in the OECD  
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occupies a large part of the overall territory of investment measures and the services 
sector absorbs some two thirds of FDI flows. Moreover, the bulk of investment entry 
restrictions are in the services sector.65 
GATS negotiations focus on limiting the tools for investment policy, both entry and 
establishment regulations  ( Article XVI), including limitations on foreign capital, 
restrictions on the type of legal entity or joint venture, limitations on the number of 
service suppliers or on the value or quantity of transactions, including through the 
application of economic needs tests, as well as and the extent to which the principle of 
national treatment is applied, including with respect to access to subsidies, (Article 
XVII). It should be noted that when making a market access commitment on a sector 
or sub-sector, a member is also committed to enable free movement of capital related 
to the provision of that service.
66 In drawing up their overall investment strategies, 
developing countries should therefore decide to what extent these various “tools” are 
essential to the accomplishment of their development objectives. If they are, they 
should be defended in trade negotiations.  
Investment performance requirements: a tool for development 
The use of performance requirements are not restricted under GATS and are actually 
encouraged, as a means of strengthening the service sectors in dev eloping countries, 
through access to technology, or information channels or distribution networks. In the 
area of trade in goods, however, two important investment performance requirements 
are prohibited by the TRIMs Agreement, (a) local content requirements, and (b) trade 
balancing requirement under which, for example, imports by investors are conditional 
upon foreign exchange earnings or export volumes. Hence, the WTO permits a wide 
range of investment performance requirements, including  export performance (those 
conditional on export volumes and earnings),  and  transfer of technology 
requirements, both  of which have been used effectively by countries which have 
demonstrated rapid growth rates.
67 Given the failure of initiatives to establish general 
disciplines on investment policy in the WTO, capital exporting countries are pursuing 
the objective of eliminating performance requirements, as well as the gamut of other 
investment  measures being negotiated in GATS, through  FTAs  and other  bilateral 
agreements. 
Transfer of technology performance requirements are aimed at increasing productivity 
by enhancing human potentials to compete in the world market. Export performance 
requirements orient production toward world markets and oblige firms to prepare 
people to compete more effectively in a world of globalized production and to seek 
new export opportunities. Performance requirements can also aim at improving 
equity, by channelling investment to poorer regions or disadvantaged segments of the 
population, or by ensuring universal provision of key services, such as electricity, 
                                                  
65  See Gibbs, Murray, Statement on Investment Policy and Human Development in Sieh Mei Ling 
Investment, Energy and Environmental Services: Promoting Human Development in WTO 
Negotiations, University of Malaya, UNDP, and Malaysian Institute of Economic Research Kuala 
Lumpur, M arch 2004 (http://www.um.edu.my). 
66 See footnote to GATS Article XVI:1.  
67  See case studies of Korea, China and Viet Nam in  Seih Mei Ling (ed.), Investment Energy and 
Environmental Services: Promoting Human Development in WTO Negotiations (Kuala Lumpur, 
UNDP, MIER and University of Malaya, March 2004) (www.um.edu.my).  
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water and sanitation. Sustainability can be promoted by giving priority to 
environmentally friendly technologies. 
Universal access to energy and environmental services, essential to the achievement 
of MDGs, will require huge amounts of investment over the next few decades. The 
terms under which this investment will take place are being defined in the current 
GATS negotiations, as described in Annexes A and B to Section V.  
The same goals can be pursued through investment incentives of a fiscal and financial 
nature. However, such incentives may result in a loss of precious revenue for the 
government of the host country and provoke competition among host countries to 
attract investors, leading to a  race to the bottom, which can undermine human 
development goals (e.g. suspension of labour rights in FTZs). Fiscal incentives may 
also be inconsistent with WTO rules (e.g . the prohibition on export subsides). 
Incentives can be used in parallel and as a complement to performance requirements. 
However, fiscal incentives can lead to a race to the bottom scenario. It is estimated 
that developing countries lose $35 billion annually due to competitive pressures to 
reduce corporate tax rates combined with the transfer of profits out of developing 
countries to low tax regimes68  
Among the different approaches to the use of investment measures, the example of 
the Republic of Korea has been cited as the most successful. Its strategy was to first 
encourage investment in labour intensive export industries, following the logic that 
export earnings should finance industrialization. The government of the Republic of 
Korea mobilized an arsenal of tools, including investment measures such as national 
ownership and export and transfer of technology requirements, combined with trade 
measures such as subsides, quantitative restrictions and tariffs (see Section  3), with 
the sole purpose of increasing its bargaining power with foreign firms. The objective 
was to move up the technological ladder, the virtuous spiral described in Section III.69 
China has followed similar goals, using some of the same techniques, moving rapidly 
up the technological ladder in export production.70 Different countries have achieved 
considerable success following different approaches, the common factor being that 
overly successful countries have adopted selective and strategic, rather than  
ideological  approaches that either uncritically welcoming  or  overly  restrict foreign 
investment
71 Such investment measures have also been a component of a broader 
industrial strategy that incorporated trade measures (e.g. tariffs and QRs) as  well as 
subsidies (see Section III).  
                                                  
68 See Stiglitz and Charlton, op. cit., pp. 266-267, drawing from Charlton, Andrew, “Incentive Bidding 
Wars for Mobile Investment; Economic Consequences and Potential Reponses ”, OECD Development 
Centre technical paper 203, OECD (Paris, 2003) (http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/63/2492289.pdf). 
See also OXFAM, Tax Havens, Releasing the Hidden Billions for Poverty Eradication (Oxford, 2000) 
(http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/debt_aid/tax_havens.htm). 
69  See Shin, Jang-Sup and  Ha-Joon Chang, “Foreign Investment Policy and Human Development 
Country study: Republic of Korea”, in Seih Mei Ling, op. cit..  
70 See Rodrik, Dani, “What’s So Special about China’s Exports?” CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5484 
(London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, February 2006) (www.nber.org/papers/w11947). 
71 See Shin and Chang, op.cit.   
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A “New Generation” of Bilateral Investment Treaties 
There are now over 2000 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) in force72. Traditionally 
used as instruments for the protection of investments, BITs are acquiring different 
characteristics. Some developed countries are pursuing a “new generation” of BITs 
which incorporate trade provisions, notably obligations on entry and establishment, 
and prohibitions on performance requirements. These usually apply to both goods and 
services and thus undermine the commitments included in the GATS services 
schedules. They also employ a wider definition of investment, i ncluding portfolio 
investment and cover a wide range of domestic regulation that can be challenged by 
the foreign investor. They also identify dispute settlement and arbitration mechanisms 
that allow foreign investors to bypass the national judicial system to a larger extent 
than was previously possible. Sometimes lack of coordination between the 
government ministry responsible for trade policy and that responsible for investment 
policy can lead to less than optimal results.  
FTAs are being used to impose m ore stringent disciplines over the scope of 
investment polices. As will be discussed in Section 8, many FTAs make national 
treatment a general obligation for both goods and services, reducing or eliminating 
the various policy tools listed in GATS Article X VI. Often this is accomplished 
through the technique of dissecting the Services Chapter of such FTAs, and bringing 
all investment policy, on both goods and services, under the scope of an Investment 
Chapter. FTAs can also include mechanisms for promoting i nvestment amongst the 
concerned parties. In fact, many developing countries believe  that FTAs with major 
trading partners will attract FDI. However, evidence shows that, with few exceptions, 
BITs and FTAs generally have little impact on attracting FDI.73 
 
VIII. MNP – ACCESS TO THE WORLD EMPLOYMENT 
MARKET 
Movement of national  persons (MNP) across frontiers to supply services provides a 
major source of potential employment and export income for many developing 
countries. However, it can also have negative social and economic impacts. What are 
the elements of a coherent strategy to maximize the contribution of MNP to 
development and the achievement of the MDGs?  
MNP and the MDGs 
The movement of persons across frontiers to supply services is a major potential 
source of  employment for poor people and an opportunity to dramatically increase 
their earnings.
74 MNP provides a means for developing countries to draw upon their 
competitive advantage of lower wage costs in trade in services as they  have 
                                                  
72 UNCTAD World Investment Report 2002. 
73  See Stiglitz and Charlton, op.cit., pp 149-152. 
74 We use the GATS acronym “MNP” rather than ”labour movement” (which would suggest unskilled  
workers) or “movement of persons” (which  could imply permanent migration  ), so as to cover the 
whole range of the provision of services that involves suppliers moving temporarily from one country 
to another from unskilled agricultural workers to highly skilled medical, engineering and IT 
professionals.  
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traditionally done in trade in goods. Labour remittances are a major source of foreign 
exchange for many developing countries. These can help reduce the vulnerability of 
poor communities from the impact of domestic economic crises, finance small local 
businesses and support extended family safety nets. MNP can also  increase equity 
since labour remittances often  provide income to particularly disadvantaged regions 
of developing countries. Work abroad can provide women with opportunities for 
wage income that do not exist at the national level. MNP can this lift persons out of 
poverty,  empower women, and provide job opportunities for youth i.e. MDG s 1, 3 
and 8 (target 16). On the other hand, the permanent emigration of professionals can 
detract from efforts to establish universal, quality services in key public service 
sectors such as health and education and, if not properly managed through an inter-
governmental bilateral or multilateral agreement, can contribute to “brain drain” 
rather than “brain circulation or ‘brain gain”.  
Impact of MNP 
Economic models suggest that expansion of MNP could generate impressive welfare 
gains for the exporting  countries.75  Even though this includes more than MNP, 
remittances by workers abroad to developing countries reached $167 billion in 2005 
and this  figure may be considerably higher since many transactions are realized 
through informal channels.
76 For a number of developing countries, such remittances 
account for over 10 percent of GNP.
77  
Short term movement of people is often essential for developing  country enterprises 
to effectively participate in international trade in services. It is a necessary component 
of a services package offered by a service exporter, with payments being made to 
employees in the exporting country. MNP can  also  lead to an upgrading of skills; 
unskilled rural persons can become more productive by acquiring  the capacity to 
perform  as industrial  workers and thus, upon their  return improve their home 
country’s  industrial competitiveness and attract investment to the manufacturing 
sector. 
Restrictions on MNP can result in prohibitive barriers to developing countries exports 
in a variety of services exports, in sectors such as software, energy services and 
construction. 
However, workers abroad can be subject to exploitative and degrading working 
conditions. While MNP can  empower women  by giving them a unique source of 
income, women are too often victims of harassment and sexual exploitation.
78 Foreign 
workers may be forced to work at lower salaries despite advanced levels of skills. 
Separation of family members can lead to neglect of children and other social 
                                                  
75 See discussion in Stiglitz and Charlton, op. cit., pp 247-252 
76  See statement of UNCTAD Secretary-General to ECOSOC Round  Table on Globalization and 
Labour Migration, 6 July 2006, United Nations, New York (www.unctad.org).  
77 Lesotho, Vanuatu, Jordan, Bosnia and Herzegovnia, Albania, Nicaragua, Yemen, Moldova, El 
Salvador and Jamaica. For more info visit www.migrationinformation.org. 
78 See Tullao, Tereso S. and Michael  Angelo Cortez, MNP and Human Development in Asia and 
Jayanetti, Sanath,  Movement of Natural Persons and its Human Development Implications 
(Housemaids and Unskilled Migrant Workers), as well as other studies on MNP UNDP Asia Trade 
Initiative on Trade and Human Development, Phase 1, technical support document (Hanoi: 2003) 
(available at www.undprcc.lk/Publications/Publications.asp?C=4).  
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problems. Labour earnings can be squandered on imported consumer goods without 
any investment in the communities. MNP is also vulnerable to political factors which 
can suddenly cut off access to markets. 
Access for Service Suppliers 
The inclusion of Mode 4  short term cross border movement of natural persons in the 
GATS framework enables developing countries to acquire secure access for their 
service workers as part of the overall balance of multilateral trade rights and 
obligations. The main barriers to MNP are economic needs tests, that permit the entry 
of foreign persons only when locals are not available to provide the services required. 
MNP is the subject of bilateral agreements (MOUs) and is now being included in 
FTAs. MNP is thus clearly an element of trade policy and trade negotiations, although 
it has been neglected in the GATS schedules of commitments.
79  
Skilled workers generally have better access to foreign markets, creating a shortage of 
skilled workers in the “exporting” country  which  may  perpetuate  since skilled 
workers are much more likely to remain in the “importing” country. MNP can in some 
cases increase inequalities,  if only persons with skills and higher incomes are given 
access to foreign markets. This unequal treatment is reflected in the structure of 
GATS commitments where bound access is normally provided to high level 
employees and managers of TNCs, or for essential professionals and skilled workers, 
such as medical staff.  However, it is  unlikely that GATS commitments  would 
exacerbate the flow of permanent emigration of skilled professionals in short supply 
in economically advanced countries. Contrary to such movement which often 
exacerbates “brain drain”, MNP commitments may actually reduce “brain drain” as, 
given the security of  access,  individuals may see less need to  seek permanent 
residence in the importing country.  The idea of a “GATS visa” has been suggested as 
a means of facilitating entry of service suppliers covered under GATS commitments, 
while ensuring the temporary nature of their stay.  
A strategy for MNP 
MNP, if appropriately designed at the inter-governmental level, can support the 
attainment of the MDGs. However, this requires a clear strategy on  the part of 
governments to maximize the benefits and deal with the adverse factors mentioned 
above. MNP exports should not be viewed as a  manifestation of failure of national 
economic policy   but  rather as  a  means of drawing benefits from globalization. 
Governments should formulate clear, comprehensive strategies with regard to MNP 
and incorporate these into national development strategies and trade policies. 
Governments  should view MNP from a competitive standpoint,.Workers can be 
trained in skills deemed to be in demand on the world market,  and niche markets can 
be targeted. 
Arrangements can be entered into with importing countries to upgrade skills to fit 
needs. Such policies should include measures to encourage the return of skilled 
migrants and incentives to discourage the emigration of people in occupations in short 
supply in developing countries.  
                                                  
79 It should be noted that most of the GCC countries, which are major importers of labour, only became 
WTO members at the end of the Uruguay Round, or subsequently, by accession.  
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Mode 1 service exports, often termed “outsourcing”, have been a way for developing 
countries to export labour intensive services, without confronting the barriers to MNP. 
However, studies have shown that successful outsourcing operations are significantly 
dependent  on the ability of technical staff to travel to  their overseas market 
countries.
80 
Labour remittances could have a greater development impact if transferred through 
specialized financial services and financial instruments which lower the level of 
transaction costs. Micro-credit and micro-enterprise support can channel savings into 
investment in productive facilities in the worker’s communities. 
Bilateral labour agreements can be pursued in certain circumstances. However, bound 
commitments in GATS or FTAs would provide greater security of access and stronger 
negotiating leverage for the exporting country. Specific commitments for access of 
clearly defined occupations can be negotiated in the framework of GATS or in FTAs. 
These can include the elimination of economic needs tests, the facilitation of visas 
and quotas for entry of workers in specific sectors or occupations.
81 Mutual 
Recognition Agreements or “occupational certificates”  82 can facilitate export of 
skilled and professional services, and ensure that remuneration is commensurate with 
qualifications. Similarly, trade agreements should contain obligations to protect the 
rights of foreign workers and shield them, particularly women, from exploitation. 
 
IX.  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
FOR THE POOR 
The WTO TRIPS Agreement has probably been the most onerous and intrusive of all 
WTO commitments for developing countries. It dramatically increased the scope of  
multilateral trade obligations by bringing the whole set of intellectual property 
instruments negotiated in WIPO into the WTO, where they are enforced through the 
possibility of trade sanctions. The TRIPS Agreement establishes minimum standards, 
but provides governments with considerable flexibility as to the mechanisms through 
which they meet their obligations.  It is precisely  with a view to reducing this 
flexibility that  bilateral pressures  have been exercised on developing countries to 
adopt “TRIPS plus” legislation. The provisions of the TRIPS Agreement that relate to 
the exclusion of plants and animals and biological processes for their production are 
open for review and possible amendment. Against this background, governments are 
faced with the challenge of making IPRs useful for poor people and supportive of the 
MDGs, by ensuring their access to medicines, protecting against bio-piracy and 
protecting and consolidating community ownership of traditional knowledge.  
                                                  
80 See Chanda, Rupa , “Intermodal Linkages to Services Trade”, OECD Trade Policy Working Paper 
No. 30, 2006. 
81 See suggestions in Butkeviciene, Jolita, “Movement of Natural Persons under GATS”, in A Positive 
Agenda, UNCTAD, op.cit.  See  also UNCTAD “Report of Expert Meeting on Ma rket Access Issues 
under Mode 4”, document TD/B/COM.1/64, 27 November 2003.  
82 See various papers presented at the Joint WTO/World Bank  Symposium on Movement of Natural 
Persons (Mode 4) under GATT, Geneva, 11-12 April 2002 (available at 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/symp_mov_natur_perso_april02_e.htm)  
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TRIPS and MDGs 
The implications of the TRIPS Agreement (and of subsequent bilateral pressures on 
developing countries to further tighten its provisions) for the attainment of the MDGs 
- notably MDG 6, have already been recognized by the international community. The 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health was agreed by the international community 
to ensure that the TRIPS Agreement’s prioritized public health  concerns. Developing 
countries must also draw up IPR legislation that ensures that the attainment of the 
MDGs will not be frustrated, while protecting  the right of poor people  to  use their 
traditional knowledge and genetic resources.  
Developing countries are faced with policy decisions at three levels, first to ensure 
that the results of the current multilateral review of the TRIPS regime, and related 
initiatives in WIPO83 are supportive of their pursuit of the MDGs; second, to draw up 
national legislation and regulations aimed at achieving these goals and targets within 
the framework of their international obligations ; and third to effectively t hwart 
pressures to accept “TRIPS plus” commitments at the bilateral level. The manner in 
which developing countries adapt to the TRIPS regime and pressures from developed 
countries is crucial to their attainment not only of the MDGs directly related to health 
(e.g. MDG to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, MDG8  provision of 
access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries), but given the relevance 
to the agricultural sector, that of eradicating poverty and hunger (MDG1) as well. 
One of the key elements of FTAs has been the inclusion of “TRIPS plus” provisions 
dealing with (a) restrictions on the use of compulsory licences, (b) restrictions on 
parallel imports, (c) greater protection of undisclosed data through market exclusivity, 
(d) broadening of the spectrum of patentability,  (e) extension of the duration of 
patents and (f) links between patents and health registration.(see Section X). 
Health 
There had been concern that the TRIPS Agreement will have a negative impact on 
human development by resulting in higher prices for essential medicines in poor 
countries. It was a result of concerted action by private firms and some countries to 
pressure developing countries into giving up certain crucial rights under the TRIPS 
Agreement that provoked the negotiation of the  Doha Declaration on TRIPS and 
Public Health. The Declaration was agreed at the Doha Ministerial Conference to 
confirm the right of governments to impose compulsory licenses when faced with 
national public health issues. However, one aspect, that of permitting countries having 
no domestic capacity to produce medicines to issue compulsory licenses to producers 
in other countries for import into the affected country, required an amendment to the 
TRIPS Agreement. This was finally accomplished in December 2005 after a period of 
protracted negotiations.84  
                                                  
83 Negotiations of a Substantive Patent Law Treaty have been initiated in WIPO. For an analysis of the  
development implications, see Correa, Carlos, An Agenda for Patent Reform and Harmonization for 
Developing Countries, paper presented to Open Forum, 1 March 2006, available at  
www.wipo.int/meetings/2006/sep_of_ge_06/presentations. See also  GRAIN, “ One global patent 
system? WIPO's Substantive Patent Law Treaty”, GRAIN briefings 2003 
(http://www.grain.org/briefings/?id=159).  
84 WTO document, Amendment of the TRIPs Agreement, Decision of 6 December 2005 (WT/L/641).  
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It is now incumbent on developing countries to ratify this Amendment, and to draw 
up legislation to govern compulsory licensing. Such legislation may also require 
provisions to ensure the admissibility of parallel imports. However, such legislation is 
only part of the comprehensive approach required to ensure that public health 
objectives can be met within the framework of TRIPS.
85  
Competition 
The need for the acceptance of parallel imports and the use of compulsory licensing 
are not confined to the health sector, although this is where they are most urgently 
needed. Both mechanisms can be used to ensure that patents are not abused for anti-
competitive purposes. Under the principle of the “exhaustion” of IPRs, once a patent 
holder has placed patented goods on the market or allowed a licensee to market, the 
patent holder has no right to control the resale of such goods, i.e. “parallel” imports 
are permitted. 86 The TRIPS Agreement, however, leaves WTO members  to decide 
whether or not to incorporate this provision into their legislation. Developing country 
governments should draw up legislation confirming the admissibility of parallel 
imports. This will avoid patent holders imposing high pric es on the domestic markets 
for essential goods that are available, under the same patent, at lower prices in other 
countries. At the same time, compulsory licensing legislation should be drawn up to 
ensure that patents are not used to block further innovation by competitors. A desire to 
acquire control over the patents of competitors has been one of the motives behind the 
dramatic increase of mergers and acquisitions resulting in a high level of 
concentration in many developing country markets.  
Genetic resources, agriculture and bio-piracy 
The TRIPS Agreement permits members to exclude plants and animals other than 
“micro-organisms” from patentability. Plant varieties must be protected, but members 
are free to accomplish this by effective  sui generis systems
87. These provisions are 
currently under review by the WTO TRIPS Council.
88.  
One major concern is that the patenting of plants and plant varieties can lead to 
situations where farmers become dependent on industrial suppliers for vital inputs 
such as seeds.
89  This has  prompted a number of developing countries to pass 
legislation to exclude the patenting of all genetic materials. These countries have met 
their obligation to protect plant varieties through sui generis legislation, usually based 
on a “breeder’s  rights” system which allows farmers the possibility of saving and 
replanting seeds, and the right to use a protected variety as a source for further 
                                                  
85 See Carlos Correa,  Integrating Public Health Concerns into Patent Legislation in Developing 
Countries, South Centre (Geneva, 2000) (www.southcentre.org). 
86  See Carlos Correa, Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO and Developing Countries,  (Zed book, 
New York, 2000). 
87  See  “Beyond UPOV  -  Examples of countries preparing non-UPOV sui generis plant variety 
protection systems for compliance with TRIPs”, GRAIN briefings 1999 
(http://www.grain.org/briefings/?id=127). 
88 As provided in TRIPs Article 27:3(b). 
89 See Vandana Shiva and Radha Hola-Bhar, Piracy by Patent; the case of the Neem Tree, quoted in 
Correa op.cit.  
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research and breeding (the prevalent practice in developing countries).
90 They should 
incorporate the concept of Farmers Rights as embodied in the International Treaty on 
Plant Genetic Resources, and draw on the experiences of  those developing countries 
which have drawn up legislation on these matters. 
Another concern is the possible conflict between the TRIPS Agreement and the 
Convention on Biodiversity (CPD), which stresses the sovereignty of States over their 
genetic resources, and respect for the innovations, knowledge and practices of 
indigenous and local communities. The focus has been on the need to preven t bio-
piracy, defined by the CPD as “unauthorized access to use of biological resources or 
traditional knowledge of the indigenous peoples by third parties without 
compensation and without necessary authorization”. In addition, patents derived from 
such genetic material may not involve significant innovation or novelty. National laws 
should be drawn up to prevent bio-piracy containing obligations such as declaring the 
country of origin, and demonstrating its prior consent, or of a particular indigenous 
community if applicable, and to compensate such communities for the development 
of new varieties, based on material that they have supplied.
91 Such laws should also 
raise the threshold of plant variety protection so that protection is limited to 
significant innovations or inventive steps deemed socially beneficial.
92 Many 
documented cases of bio-piracy have been submitted by developing countries in 
support of their proposal93 aiming at the inclusion in the TRIPS Agreement of an 
obligation to require the disclosure of the origin of genetic resources and/or associated 
traditional knowledge,
94 which they consider necessary for the effective application of 
such laws.  
GIs and Traditional Knowledge 
Developing countries are using a variety of legal mechanisms to protect traditional 
knowledge. Geographical indications (GIs) may provide one effective means to this 
end.
95 Unlike patents and trade marks GIs are community owned, cannot be sold and 
do not expire. They empower indigenous communities by providing recognition and 
                                                  
90 For detailed suggestions as to how IPR legislation can make use of the flexibilities in the TRIPs 
Agreement in pursuit of the MDGs and development friendly outcomes see  Correa, Carlos M., 
Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO and Developing Countries: The TRIPS Agreement and Policy 
Options (Zed books: London/New York, 2000) (www.zedbooks.co.uk). 
91 See Carlos Correa,  “Reviewing the TRIPS Agreement”  in  A Positive Agenda for Future  Trade 
Negotiations, op.cit.. 
92 See recommendation by the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights,  “Integrating Intellectual 
Property Rights and Development Policy ” (London: 2002) 
(www.iprcommission.org/graphic/documents/final_report.htm). 
93 See submission from Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, India, Peru, Thailand and Venezuela IP/C/W/420 on 
www.wto.org.  
94  For example, the case of camu-camu recently submitted by Peru in WTO document IP/C/W458 
describes in detail how a traditional product native to Peru’s Amazon region had served as a basis for 
patents in developing countries without the knowledge or consent of Peru (www.wto.org). 
95 The TRIPS Agreement (Article 22:1) defines GIs as “ indications which identify a good as 
originating in the territory of a member , or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality 
,reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin”.   
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commercial value to their traditional knowledge and production techniques
96. GIs 
have been associated with luxury products (e.g. champagne), but the fact is that these 
producers became wealthy because of the GI system.97 For example, some developing 
countries have viewed GIs as one way to mitigate low commodity prices in the coffee 
sector.  Partly in reaction to the theft of geographical expressions (e.g. Ceylon tea, 
basmati rice, Phu Quouc fish sauce) many developing countries are supporting the 
objective of extending the more stringent GI protection of wines and spirits to all 
products, in order to reduce the difficulties and costs of enforcing GIs in foreign 
jurisdictions which limit the effectiveness of GIs in protecting traditional knowledge. 
The outcome of  these negotiations will become an important element of the Doha 
package in this area.  
However, effective use of GIs requires government actions at the national level to (a) 
pass legislation to protect GIs, and (b) adopt measures to identify and promote GIs, as 
public investment is required to establish the reputation of little known GIs in 
developing countries.  
While the development of GIs at the national level and  participation in a multilateral 
register as has been proposed in the WTO will inevitably involve significant costs, 
these should be viewed against the long-term perspective of the losses that will occur 
if such products are appropriated by TNCs. In addition, there will be costs associated 
with monitoring and challenging IPRs issued around the world.
98  Moreover, if 
geographical expression becomes an accepted generic term, it will become freely 
useable by all. 
                                                  
96 See Swarnim Wagle, Geographical Indications TRIPs and Promoting Human Development in Asi, 
and The development dimensions of the Sri Lankan Geographical Indication of Camellia Sinensis 
(Ceylon Tea), UNDP Asia Trade Initiative Hanoi 2003. 
97 See, Dwijien Rangnekar, The Socio-Economics of Geographical Indications, at 
www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/docs .  
98 Commission on Intellectual Property, op.cit.   
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Box 19: Thailand’s “One Tambon, One Product” 
Thailand’s “One Tambon, One Product” program, launched in 2003, stands out. The 
government has set out to select 60 community products and has upgraded and certif ied their 
quality with the intention of expanding, first, their domestic market, followed by exports. 
Trade Fairs organized to generate incomes and develop local products at the grassroots in all 
the country’s 76 provinces have led to the identification of distinctive fabrics, artistic 
creations, processed food and fruit, utensils, wickerwork and fermented liquor that the 
government now seeks to promote. It has already begun to pro-actively showcase its famous 
produce of Hom Mali rice in big regional markets.
99 This Thai example offers a rural 
development example for bottom-up engineering of awareness and action on promoting 
traditional community products. The irony, however, is that this rural development program 
has not been overtly linked with the idea of GIs  because of insufficient inter-ministry 
coordination. This missing link is noteworthy because GIs are the only form of modern IP 
that grassroots communities are likely to own. The risk of driving GI awareness with a top-
down legislative decree, possibly triggered only by external treaty obligations, or supply-
driven foreign aid programs is that it may not command enough national ownership for 
effective enforcement.  
 
X.  THE FTA OPTION 
Whilst continuing to participate in the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, 
virtually all developing countries have been caught up in the proliferation of FTAs. 
Many countries are actively engaged in sub-regional and regional integration, and at 
the same time involved in bilateral FTAs with extra-regional partners, including the 
major trading countries. Involvement in multiple trade negotiations at different levels 
gives rise to a series of implications for development strategies. Developing countries 
are faced with major policy choices, whether to enter into FTAs,  if so  with which 
partners, as well the challenge of undertaking an analysis of costs and benefits of each 
potential agreement. 
FTAs and the MDGs 
FTAs, b y definition, reduce policy space to a much greater extent than multilateral 
obligations and would seem, at first glance, to be in conflict with  MDG8 target 12, 
which calls for a non-discriminatory trading system. FTAs are high risk in the sense 
that their potential negative impact for the attainment of MDGs can be exacerbated 
through the further contraction of policy space. This is likely to be particularly  true 
for North-South FTAs, where political considerations are often paramount. On the 
other hand, FTAs  (especially those involving South-South cooperation between 
countries at roughly similar stages of development) can provide innovative, pro -
development provisions that would be difficult to apply at the multilateral level. The 
outcome  of FTAs depends largely on the power relationships between the parties and 
the extent to which all stakeholders can exert an influence on the negotiating process. 
                                                  
99  Visit www.boi.go.th/thai/focus/prd_03jan13.html#2. The Commerce Minister led a delegation in 
December 2002 to promote the sale of Thai Hom Mali rice to China where in 2001, 240,000 tons of 
Jasmine rice was exported, compared with 200,000 tons to the US. Another small example of 
conscious Thai promotion is gifts of GIs such as 20g boxes of Longan fruits from Lamphun province 
on Thai Airways flights during 2003.  
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The Proliferation of FTAs 
Over recent years developing countries have been involved in an ever intensifying 
process involving the negotiation of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), with a multitude 
of partners (only one WTO member has not entered into  an   FTA). These have 
included: 
(a)  a more positive and ambitious approach to traditional efforts at sub-regional 
and regional integration between  developing countries, 
(b)  extra-regional FTAs with major developed countries (North/South FTAs,) 
(c)  extra-regional FTAs with other developing countries.  
Each of these involves different policy considerations, both economic and political. 
Access to Northern markets, once extended on an autonomous, preferential and non-
reciprocal basis, is now increasingly subject to reciprocal concessions by developing 
countries within the framework of FTAs. This has created a chain reaction based on 
the “fear of exclusion”, which has been exacerbated by the real or anticipated fear of 
the withdrawal of existing non-contractual preferences,  even though a large 
percentage of exports often  enter MFN duty free.
100. The exclusion of key products, 
such as clothing, from certain GSP schemes has also contributed to this pressure.
101 
The negotiation of an FTA between one developing country and a major trading 
country creates pressure on competing developing countries to seek to enter into a 
similar agreement for fear of losing out to its competitors in terms of  exports and 
incoming FDI.102 
Developing countries are making broad concessions in a variety of areas, often 
adversely affecting human development prospects, in order to obtain the elimination 
of tariff rates that should be obtainable in the multilateral negotiations at much less 
cost in terms of reciprocal concessions. FTA negotiations are less transparent and 
more political than WTO multilateral rounds. They are thus more vulnerable to 
“capture” by those vitally interested sectors that  can gain immediate benefits from 
concessions granted in return for broader reciprocal concessions which  can adversely 
affect a wide range of less informed stakeholders and seriously restrict development 
policy options. This creates a bias towards inequitable results. FTA negotiations 
should, therefore,  be subject to at least the same degree of transparency as WTO 
negotiating proposals and should be accessible and subject to public discussion. 
Development Implications of FTAs 
It is difficult for developing countries to achieve s ymmetry in North-South FTAs. 
They start from a situation where many of their industrial goods exports enter duty 
free under the GSP, albeit unbound. Bound MFN tariff rates in the OECD countries 
are quite low, and have been eliminated in many sectors of interest to developing 
countries, although tariff peaks remain in key sectors such as T&C and agriculture. 
Bound  MFN rates in developing countries are often considerably higher. Thus, the 
                                                  
100  For example, the expiry of the USA Andean Trade Preference Scheme on 31 December 2006 has 
placed the beneficiary countries under considerable pressure to conclude FTAs with the United States.  
101 Se discussion in Annex 3A 
102 See UNDP Asia Trade and Investment Initiative,  The Great Maze, Regional and Bilateral Free 
Trade Agreements in Asia, Colombo, December 2005 www.undpprcc.lk.  
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burden of tariff liberalization in North-South RTAs weighs asymmetrically on 
developing countries. While it is estimated that trade among RTA and FTA partners 
makes up nearly 40 per cent of world trade, a much smaller amount of this trade 
actually benefits from preferential tariff margins as much of the trade among these 
countries  is in items where the MFN rate is zero..
103 On the other hand, FTAs among 
developing countries may result in meaningful tariff reductions and substantial 
margins of preference.
104  
More than Spaghetti! 
There is a need to assess the potential concrete gains from FTAs before entering into 
their negotiation, examining such aspects as the real improvement in access that can 
be achieved, the likelihood that comparable results can be obtained from multilateral 
negotiations and the extent to which the real access problems require a multilateral 
solution.105 There is also the need to examine the objectives of the trading partner. 
These may have a strong political content, or may reflect positions they have taken 
and strategies they are pursuing at the global level. Far from being the confused 
“spaghetti bowl” described by some observers, FTAs are the manifestation of 
coherent geopolitical strategies on the part of the major trading countries.  
Developed countries are using FTAs as a means of furthering their multilateral 
agendas by locking in developing partners to commitments that reflect their positions 
in the WTO negotiations. One example is the treatment of GIs, where the EU FTAs 
impose a TRIPS plus protection, while United States FTAs impose TRIPS minus 
(eliminating the possibility of sui generic GI systems and replacing them with regular 
trademark systems of protection).106  
Sectoral interests in developing countries may gain from the elimination of duties on 
products not covered by preferences where MFN tariff rates present a significant 
barrier to trade, such as in textiles or agriculture. However, duty free entry of textiles 
and clothing is often subject to complicated rules of origin, while sensitive 
agricultural products may be excluded. Furthermore,  most FTAs do not establish 
disciplines on agricultural subsidies in the major developed countries,  thus exposing 
farmers in the developing partner to unfair competition,  even though some involve 
bilateral disciplines on export subsidies.
107  Furthermore, agriculture s afeguard 
mechanisms may only be applied over the implementation period.
108  Developing 
countries generally do not have the competitive strengths to take advantage of 
                                                  
103 See World Bank , Global Economic Prospects, 2005 p.41 
104 For example only one per cent of India’s ta riff lines had M FN rates of zero, Ibid.p41 
105 The FTAA negotiations have not succeeded largely because the MERCOSUR countries perceived 
that the main barriers facing their access to the USA market (agricultural subsidies and anti-dumping 
measures) could not be effectively addressed at the regional level. 
106 See  Vivas, David and Christophe Spennemann, “Dialogo Regional sobre Propiedad Intelectual, 
Innovación y Desarrollo Sostenible” (UNCTAD/ICTSD Project on Intellectual Property and 
Sustainable Development, Costa Rica, May 2006) (www.ictsd.org). 
107 Some attempt has been made to deal with agricultural export subsidies in the Chile/USA FTA, 
however. 
108 Bellmann, Cristophe, “Latin American Countries in Bilateral and Multilateral Agricultural 
negotiations”, presentation to the Andean Development Corporation, 
(www.caf.com/attach/11/default/Lat_am_Ag.pdf).  
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services liberalization in these agreements, particularly as many new opportunities are 
not provided for the short-term movement of persons (GATS Mode 4). 
FTAs with the North 
From the perspective of national development strategy, the advantages and 
disadvantages of FTAs differ considerably according to the choice of partners. In FTA 
negotiations with developed countries, developing countries often find themselves 
confronted with requests for commitments that may undermine their WTO rights 
and/or include commitments in areas which developing countries have not accepted 
as part of the WTO agenda. Thus, where the main objective of developing countries in 
FTAs is to obtain free access for their key export products, and avoid or preempt 
negative margins of tariff preferences in favour of their competitors, they  find 
themselves subject to commitments of an even wider scope and deeper intrusiveness 
than those  in  WTO agreements. Some developed countries appear to be pursuing a 
parallel trade agenda in their FTAs, aimed at achieving commitments form their FTA 
partners that they have been unable to achieve in the multilateral context. In some 
cases, the developed partner follows a set “template” which it seeks to apply in each 
FTA it negotiates.
109 
…and the South 
The expanding FTAs among developing countries generally adopt a different format. 
They may contain a n “early harvest” of items to be liberalized immediately, with 
many issues left to be negotiated in subsequent stages. In some cases, this early 
harvest includes textiles and horticultural products normally considered as sensitive in 
North South FTAs. Commitments on services follow the GATS positive list format, 
adding regional and bilateral commitments to the multilateral schedules.110 The 
proliferation of bilateral FTAs with regional trading partners is often conducted under 
a broad framework agreement intended to eventually lead to  extensive  regional 
integration. Individual countries  and groupings of developing countries are entering 
into FTAs with extra regional developing partners. These usually contain considerably 
flexibility and are aimed at gaining a  foothold in new, and growing markets. 
 
                                                  
109 See  www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/bilateral (USA FTAs), and www.ecdpm.org ( EU FTAs), and 
www.bilaterals.org for overview of all FTA negotiations and links to many sources. 
110 See Marconini, Mario, Acordos Regionais e o Comercio de Servicos: normativa internacional e 
interesse brasiliero (Sao Paulo: Aduanieras 2003).  
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Box 20: The New or “Singapore” Issues 
At the Marrakech Conference which concluded the Uruguay Round and established 
the WTO, the concluding remarks of the Chairman set out the elements of a possible 
work programme f or the new O rganization.
111 In addition to trade and labour 
standards strongly advocated by the United States, the list included a wide range of 
items such as the relationship between immigration policies and international trade, 
international trade and comp any law, the establishment of a compensation mechanism 
for the erosion of trade preferences and the link between trade, development, political 
stability, and the alleviation of poverty. Only two of these, trade and investment and 
trade and competition policy were retained at the first WTO Ministerial Conference in 
Singapore in 1996 to which were added transparency in government procurement and 
trade facilitation (i.e. the Singapore issues). All but trade facilitation were dropped at 
the Cancun Conference in 2003.
112 Nevertheless, the developed country proponents of 
the Singapore Issues have continued to pursue the missing three in FTAs with 
developing countries.  
Policy Space within FTAs 
While it should be expected that a FTA will result in the elimination of  tariff 
protection for “substantially all” of the  mutual trade between its members, (i.e. in 
conformity with Article XXIV of GATT),  many  FTAs involve additional 
commitments  that   can severely reduce or eliminate “policy space” permitted by 
WTO  agreements.  Such commitments negatively affect the ability of developing 
countries to pursue development objectives.Attention should be given to Policy Space 
in such areas as: 
(a) Intellectual property. Particular attention should be given to provisions of FTAs 
which may impose commitments which eliminate flexibilities provided by the TRIPS 
Agreement, by seriously constraining the scope to impose compulsory licensing, even 
those applied to pharmaceuticals for health purposes113. Such provisions undermine 
both the spirit and the intent of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, in 
addition to permitting patent holders to block parallel imports114. FTAs in this area 
may also require the patenting of plants and/or animals or even all life forms and 
undermine measures i ntended to prevent bio-piracy
115. Trade marks may be given 
precedence  so as  to pre-empt the use of GIs by communities, while patent and 
                                                  
111 See document MTN.TNC/Min(94)/6 (www.wto.org).  
112  For an insight into the events leading to this decision see Supperamaniam M. Epilogue, in Sieh Mei 
Ling op.cit. 
113 See Sanya Reid  Smith,  TRIPs provisions in US free trade agreements that effect medicine prices  
paper paper presented to  Regional meeting of Civil Society organizations on FTAs .in the Arab region 
, Cairo 9-11 December 2006 
 
114 R ecent United States legislation discourages the  inclusion of provisions restricting parallel 
importation in future FTAs Sec. 631 of Science, State, Justice and Commerce and Related 
Appropriations Act 2006, Public Law 109-108,.. 
115 See Silvia Rodriguez Cervantes,  FTAs:  Trading Away Traditional Knowledge,  GRAIN briefings 
2006 (http://www.grain.org/briefings_files/fta -tk-03-2006-en.pdf).  
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copyright protection may be extended beyond the limits established in TRIPS. Data 
exclusivity provisions effectively extend patent protection for periods in excess of the 
TRIPS limits 
(b) Investment provisions may prohibit performance requirements permitted by the 
WTO TRIMs Agreement, e.g. transfer of technology, export performance, or those on 
investment in services which are actually encouraged by the WTO GATS Agreement 
as a means of strengthening the service sector of developing countries. Investment 
chapters usually provide for across the board national treatment and right of 
establishment undermining the commitments that  have been carefully negotiated in 
GATS. This is most significant when “Investment” chapters provide for the “absolute 
right to transfer funds”, thus undermining the prudential provisions built into financial 
service commitments in GATS. “Expropriation” may  be interpreted in such a way that 
private investors can challenge states and obtain compensation for opportunities lost 
due to action by governments at different levels to protect the environment or attain 
other social goals. Dispute settlement provisions may permit investors to seek 
settlement outside of the State’s domestic courts through alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms, in particular but not limited to binding international arbitration. 
(c) The cumulative effect of FTA chapters on “Investment”, “Trade in Services”, and 
“Electronic Commerce” may undermine government measures to promote social and 
cultural goals (e.g. universal coverage, cultural integrity etc.). Negative lists for trade 
in services leave no policy space to deal with new technologically advanced services 
when they emerge. Particular attention should be given to the cultural sector where 
the combination of negative lists for services and provisions aimed at the free 
movement of electronic commerce  (including digital products) can r esult in 
undermining reservations made  in GATS schedules to preserve the “cultural 
exception” 
116. 
(d) Safeguards on agricultural trade can  be subject to a phase out period after which 
total liberalization applies. Liberalization can take the form of a staged increase of 
TRQs to a point where no limits apply. This is often combined with a phase out of the 
over quota tariff rate.
117 Attention should be given to incorporating such safeguards 
into FTAs using the same criteria as used in the WTO, in order to protect food 
security, livelihoods and promote rural development. Legislation for safeguard 
measures (SSM) e.g. trigger mechanisms, should be in place before entering into FTA 
negotiations. The issue of whether an agreement in the WTO on on SSM and SP 
would prevail over existing FTAs has not been resolved. 
(g) Tariff protection on sensitive products may not be permitted indefinitely, but 
should be subject to a longer phase out period. 
(h) Obligations on Government Procurement are included. These can have the 
same structure as the WTO plurilateral agreement, but are applied on a 
discriminatory basis and cover both goods and services. 
                                                  
116 See Bernier, Ivan, Recent FTAs of the United States as Illustrations of their New Strategy Regarding 
the Audio-Visual Sector (2004)  (www.mcc.gouv.qc.ca/international/diversite -
culteiurelle/eng/pdf/conf_seoul_ang_2004.pdf).  
117 In the Peru USA Agreement, for example, safeguards in the form of a “snap back” to MFN tariffs 
are triggered by imports exceeding the TRQ .by a certain percentage.  
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(i)   Commitments on subsidies may prohibit dual price systems for energy, which 
are permitted under the WTO. 
FTAs may also fall short of their objectives in terms of market access for developing 
countries:Key export products (e.g. rice, sugar, beef) or services (e.g. MNP) may be 
excluded, or subject to minimal liberalization, 
(j)  Rules of origin requirements may be difficult to meet and ,thus, many exports 
may not benefit from duty free treatment.. Attention should be given to 
ensuring that stringent rules of origin do not undermine the competitiveness of 
industries, and that cumulative origin provisions are included. “Yarn forward” 
type rules of origin may undermine the competitive position of the beneficiary 
exporting country to the extent that the preferential tariff margin is not 
sufficient to offset competition from non-preferential suppliers. 
(k)  Non tariff barriers (e.g. SPS) may still impede exports, 
(l)  Some measures distorting mutual trade may not lend themselves to bilateral or 
regional solutions (e.g. agricultural subsidies, anti-dumping measures). Y et, 
they  could nullify the expected benefits of the FTA  provision aimed at 
eliminating export subsidies which has been included in some agreements.118  
Conversely,  on the positive side of the balance sheet,  FTAs  may provide an 
opportunity to deal with issues not easily amenable to multilateral solutions, 
including: 
(m)  MNP commitments, such as access for MNP at  an occupational level. 
Measures for protection of foreign workers may be easier to negotiate at a 
bilateral level119 
(n) Negotiations of Mutual Recognition Agreements, with respect to testing 
facilities (e.g. SPS) as well as the certification of service professionals are 
often better facilitated in a sub-regional or bilateral context.120 
(o) Assistance for net -food importing countries.
121 
(p) Cooperation measures in areas such as cultural services and transportation can 
be worked out in FTAs. 
                                                  
118 Some attempts have been made, e.g. Canada /Chile prohibits anti-dumping duties on mutual trade, 
Chile/USA and Peru /USA provide for the elimination of export subsidies in mutual trade , so long as 
action is taken to confront export subsidies from third countries, see 
www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/bilateral/Peru_TPA and 
www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/bilateral/Chile_TPA. 
119 The last issue to be resolved in the  negotiations of a Philippine Japan FTA was the quota for the 
entry of nurses and respect for their professional qualifications. For a description of the issues involved 
see Tullao, Tereso S  .and M.  A. Cortez, Movement of Natural  Persons between  the Philippines and 
Japan: Issues and Prospects, presentation at De La Salle University, Manila,  September  2003 
(available at http://pascn.pids.gov.ph/jpepa/docs/tullao-revised_sept%209.PDF). 
120 See for example the approach of Singapore, www.fta.gov.sq  
121 See  draft Economic Partnership Agreement between the EU and the COMESA countries, 4
th draft 
EPA/8
th RNF/24-8-2006 (available at www.bilaterals.org).  
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(q) SPS and TBT. Within the framework of FTAs, developing countries can obtain 
provisions for financial and technical assistance to overcome barriers, 
information exchange, guidelines f or verification, certification and  import 
checks that can provide greater security for exporters.122  FTAs can also 
include provisions for technical and financial assistance in a wide range of 
sectors, such as energy, fisheries, protection of traditional knowledge, 
commodity diversification as well as infrastructural development.
123 
(r)  Measures to promote trade and investment (incentives, trade fairs) and address 
problems of competition (e.g. tourism). Also some FTAs contain programmes 
under which assistance is provided to upgrade the competitiveness of 
enterprises in the partner country.
124 
(s)  Rules of origin tailored to the needs of the developing partners.  
 
 
                                                  
122 See  Rudloff, B. and J. Simon, “Comparing EU FTAs, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulations”, 
ECDPM in Brief (Maastricht: 2004) (www.ecdpm.org). 
123 See draft Economic Partnership Agreement between the EU and the COMESA countries, op. cit. 
124 An example is the “mise a niveau” programme financed by the EU in its Mediterranean partners. 
See Lakhoua, Faycal, “The Tunisian Experience of ‘Mise à Niveau’, Conceptual Issues and Policy 
Orientations”, Marrakech, September 1998 
(http://www.worldbank.org/mdf/mdf2/papers/benefit/finance/lakhoua.pdf).   
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XI.  SECTORAL ANNEXES 
Annex 3A: Textiles and Clothing: Still the first step to 
Industrialization?  
The textiles and clothing (T&C) sector has provided the first step to industrialization 
for a large number of countries, including those which are now highly developed. It 
currently provides a major source of employment and foreign exchange for a large 
number of poor countries. However, these governments are faced with the question of 
devising a strategy for enabling their T&C sectors to continue this role in the more 
competitive world market that emerged after the full phase-out of quotas with the 
implementation of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing on 1 January 2005. 
T&C and the MDGs 
The T&C sector has provided an impetus for economic growth and industrialization 
in a large number of countries, including those now highly developed. It provides 
crucial export earnings and world exports exceeded $453 billion in 2004.125 T&C was 
among the top two most dynamic sectors in world trade over the past two decades 
despite being subject to high tariffs and quotas in the main importing countries. The 
growth in the world market for clothing in particular can be expected to be 
maintained, providing continuing opportunities of all efficient producers. Most 
importantly, the T&C sector is a major employer of over 40 million people, 
particularly women, providing them with otherwise unavailable employment 
opportunities. In many developing countries the achievement of the MDGs is closely 
linked to the future of the T&C sector.  
For many developing countries, the opportunities for export oriented growth and 
employment were a result of the artificial regime (the MFA and it predecessors) that 
governed world trade in this sector for a half century. The full implementation of the 
WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) on 1 January 2005, which 
“integrated” this sector within the normal multilateral rules, has placed in question the 
ability of many developing countries, particularly LDCs, to compet e against larger 
and more efficient suppliers. Developing countries, both current and potential 
exporters of textiles and clothing, are faced with the need for a policy response to a 
more competitive trading environment.  
Potential new suppliers must assess whether the T&C sector, and especially the 
clothing sub-sector still provides opportunities for growth and employment and 
warrants priority in development strategies. These strategies have involved (a) the 
pursuit of improved access conditions to major m arkets, (b) national strategies to 
enhance productivity and competitiveness (c) actions to ensure that the benefits of 
exports are widely shared and (d) improvement of working conditions.
126  
                                                  
125 www.wto.org 
126 The Section draws heavily from UNDP Asia Pacific Trade and Investment Initiative, International 
Trade in Textiles and Clothing and Development Policy Options: After the Full Implementation of the 
WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) on 1 January 2005, policy paper (Colombo: 2005) 
(www.undprcc.lk/Publications/Publications/T&CPolicyPaper.pdf).  See also publications of the 
International Textiles and Clothing Bureau at www.itcb.org.  
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Market Access 
Even after the abolition of the quota system, exporting countries face difficult 
conditions of access to the major markets. A number of exporting countries are 
partners with the United States or the European Union in FTAs or otherwise benefit 
from preferential tariff treatment. Most major countries have complied with their 
obligation (MDG 8), to provide duty free access all imports from LDCs. However, the 
USA appears unwilling to extend such treatment to T&C. Other developing countries 
benefit from GSP treatment in the T&C sector, again except in the United  States. 
Tariff protection thus remains high in this sector.
127  
However, exporting countries are obviously extremely concerned that they  should 
receive the most favourable access conditions possible to meet international 
competition. They can pursue multilateral initiatives to secure duty free treatment in 
the context of the GSP, or special duty free regimes for LDCs. LDCs are pressing for 
this treatment to be bound, i.e. that it would constitute a “right”” in the WTO and 
become defensible under the dispute settlement mechanism. However this has not yet 
been accepted. LDCs suffered a setback at the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference 
when it was agreed that developed countries could exempt 3 percent of their imports 
from LDCs from the duty free obligation after the deadline of 2008! LDCs should 
continue to pursue 100% duty free, quota free access which coincides with MDG 8, 
target 13, as the best means of ensuring preferential access to major world markets.  
The Doha Round NAMA negotiating group has also considered the zero-zero option, 
(i.e. sectoral free trade) in T&C. The most likely outcome would seem to be a tariff 
harmonizing formula.  
The remaining tariff barriers to T&C imports have led to pressures from the industries 
in exporting developing countries to negotiate FTAs with major importing countries, 
particularly the USA, which does not accord GSP treatment in this sector. Duty free 
access for textiles and clothing is usually subject to complex rules of origin which 
accord different treatment to different p referential trading partners. These rules of 
origin usually are intended to ensure a “captive market” for yarn and fabric exporters 
of the “importing” country. FTAs usually require important reciprocal concessions on 
the part of the exporting developing country. The FTA option entails the risk that 
T&C exporters will have excessive influence on the FTA negotiation, leading to 
apparent gains for T&C exporters being “purchased”  at the expense of  excessive 
reciprocal concessions in other sectors which could undermine development efforts 
by the exporting  developing country. In negotiating FTAs, rules of origin which 
maximize the scope for sourcing of inputs, and contain reasonable value added 
criteria are crucial, if real benefits are to be derived by the developing T&C exporting 
country. The various considerations involved in following the FTA option are set out 
in Section X. 
T&C has been included in FTAs among developing countries, and in some cases, 
given priority in an “early harvest list”. Some countries such as Thailand have made 
                                                  
127 See Chapter 4 of the UNDP Human Development Report 2005, International Cooperation at a 
Crossroads: Aid, Trade and Security in an Unequal World (New York, 2005) 
(http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005/).  
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use of regional agreements  between developing countries to diversify their export 
markets.
128 
Rules of Origin 
Preferential tariff treatment inevitably involves rules of origin. The US FTAs, for 
example, impose “yarn forward” rules of origin, under which duty free treatment is 
granted only to those T&C exports made from yarns and fabrics originating in either 
the USA or the exporting county. FTAs with different partners contain variations of 
the “yarn forward” rules, some more liberal than others. The EU preferences include a 
double transformation criterion. Stringent and complicated Rules of Origin may result 
in either (a) the non-compliance of exports do not comply with the criteria,  thereby 
disqualifying them from preferential treatment. They are thus, dutiable at MFN rates, 
(b) the compliance of exports with the rules  which allow them to enter duty free. 
However, they are so burdened by the criteria that they cannot compete, even with the 
benefit of preferential tariff margins. It is  obvious that rules of origin permitting 
inputs from the cheapest and highest quality sources would be preferable. The extent 
to which the exporting country produces input (i.e. textiles and fabrics) determines the 
impact of such rules. Nevertheless, even major producers of raw materials have found 
it necessary to use imported inputs to remain competitive. 
Experience has shown that rules of origin are a major determining factor in access to 
T&C markets. When Canada relaxed its rules of origin for clothing imports from 
LDCs, eliminating double transformation and reducing value added to 25 percent, 
imports from LDCs increased exponentially! Stringent rules of origin may explain 
why preferential exporters are losing their share of markets despite tariff margins129. 
Cumulation provisions can facilitate conformity with rules of origin and promote 
trade among developing countries. 
The post ATC trade flows (for 2005) indicate that most preferential suppliers, are 
losing their market shares, particularly in the United States market to China and a few 
other Asian countries (e.g. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia and Cambodia), 
which have held their  own in the post ATC scenario. In the absence of quotas, 
preferential tariff margins generally do not provide an adequate cost advantage over 
more competitive suppliers, particularly when handicapped by “yarn forward” types 
of rules of origin. In other smaller countries, where textile and clothing industries 
                                                  
128 See Adhikari, Ratnakar and Yumiko Yamamoto, Sewing Thoughts, How to realize Human 
Development gains in the post -Quota World, Tracking Report (Colombo: UNDP Asia Pacific Trade 
and Investment Initiative, April 2006) 
(www.undprcc.lk/Publications/Publications/TC_Tracking_Report_April_2006.pdf).  
129 The submission by the relevant sectoral advisory committee (ITAC-5) on the USA Bahrain FTA is 
quite eloquent on the impact of the yarn forward rule. A survey of major apparel retailers conducted by 
the National Retail Federation confirms the deficiencies of the yarn forward rules of origin. It was the 
unanimous view of survey respondents that a yarn forward rule is not cost effective and results in a net 
increase in the cost of apparel production, even when the savings from the elimination of tariffs and 
quota charges are factored in.  All  retailers participating in the survey further reported that yarn 
forward rules of origin have affected their sourcing operations by accelerating the shift in apparel 
trade away from preferential trading partner countries, such as Mexico, that are subject to this rule to 
certain large Asian suppliers, notably  China. Although segments of the US textile industry have 
strongly advocated a yarn forward rule of origin in FTAs as necessary to protect domestic yarn and 
fabric production from Chinese competition, experience has shown that such a rule has the opposite 
effect and has resulted in an accelerated shift of apparel sourcing to China.  
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were established almost exclusively to escape quotas, the industries have already 
collapsed (e.g. Lesotho, Maldives and Nepal)
130. 
Increasing Productivity and Competitiveness 
In the short run, governments can improve competitiveness by reducing direct input 
costs, (such as labour and fabric) through (a) removal of tariff, f iscal and other 
impediments on imports of yarns or fabrics, (b) improvements in labour productivity, 
through training programmes. Higher levels of education and skills of workers can 
facilitate successful specialization in niche markets of more complicated clothing, 
such as the case of Sri Lanka in women’s garments.
131  
A series of other indirect costs can be reduced through programmes to improve 
infrastructure and logistics, streamline bureaucratic procedures, provide facilities for 
specialized education and develop human resources in design. Other factors being 
comparable, buyers will give priority to suppliers who can deliver new styles quickly 
and replenish inventory rapidly. Reduction of these indirect costs is crucial to meeting 
buyers’ needs. With the elimination of the quota regime, buyers will inevitably reduce 
their number of suppliers and deal with factories that can meet their requirements. On 
the other hand, they will want to spread their country risk and seek competitive 
suppliers in several countries. 
National policy measures to strengthen competitiveness and export performance, 
through trade facilitation, export credit facilities, particularly for SMEs will also be 
important. Over the longer run, government can encourage the creation of brands and 
nurture reputations. The stakes are very high because the development of an export 
capacity in the textiles and garment sector was the first step in the industrialization 
process for many countries. Given this historical context, the premature disappearance 
of this sector before new industries can be developed could severely constrict 
possibilities of creating the virtuous spiral described in Sections III and IV.  
Equity: Sharing of Benefits 
T&C exporters must also deal with the legacy of poor working conditions and abuse 
which have plagued the sector. The T&C sector has been associated with “sweatshop” 
working conditions and abuse of workers, especially women, which has raised 
international concern. In some cases, working conditions are unsustainable.It h as 
beenclaimed that  women working in the garment industry in Bangladesh are obliged 
to leave their jobs after five years due to deteriorating health caused by the working 
conditions. Such treatment is counterproductive as poor working conditions reduce 
productivity. Successful countries have been those which have invested in upgrading 
skills of workers.  
Increased competition may result in reduced employment and a further deterioration 
in working conditions. Measures such as new legislation are needed to ensure that 
ILO Conventions are respected. Buyers have also become sensitive to social issues, 
and wish to be assured that their suppliers cannot be accused of not meeting minimum 
                                                  
130 Ibid. 
131 See  Adhikari, Ratnakar and Yumiko Yamamoto, Flying Colours, Broken Threads: One Year of 
Evidence from Asia after the Phase-out of Textiles and Clothing Quotas, Tracking Report (Colombo: 
UNDP Asia Pacific Trade and Investment Initiative, December 2005) (www.undprcc.lk).  
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labour standards. For example, Cambodia’s efforts to respect labour standards seem to 
have been appreciated by buyers
132.  
 
                                                  
132 Ibid.  
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Annex 3B: Fisheries, Putting the products of the poor on world 
markets 
The fisheries sector is a source of nutrition and employment to millions of poor 
people and has provided them with opportunities to access lucrative export markets. 
However, exports of fishery products give rise to a series of challenges relating to 
environmental protection and distribution of benefits. Developing countries are faced 
with the challenge of maximizing the contribution of this sector to the achievement of 
the MDGs. While the fisheries sector is unique in many aspects, other export 
industries in developing countries encounter similar challenges of distribution of 
benefits and environmental impact. 
Fisheries and MDGs 
Fishermen are among the poorest segments of the population, small scale fishing 
contributes to a more equitable distribution of resources while being a source of food 
and employment.133  This is particularly true of those who have no access to 
agricultural land, credit and capital equipment. According to  the  FAO, 3 8 million 
people were directly involved in marine fisheries and aquaculture in the year 2002, of 
whom 20 per cent may be in the small-scale sub-sector earning less than US$1 a day. 
Another 17 million income-poor,  including a high proportion of women, are 
employed in boatbuilding, net making, marketing and processing.. Fisher folk are 
often in the lowest segments of the population in terms of human development 
indicators such as literacy, and maternal mortality. The fisheries sector is vulnerable 
to weather conditions and natural disasters; the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami 
destroyed the livelihoods of millions of poor fish workers. Thus, development of the 
fisheries sector can play an important role in helping coastal communities reach the 
United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), especially Goal 1, 
eradicating extreme poverty and hunger. 
Fisheries and aquaculture exports have been growing rapidly. Globally, fish has 
become a highly traded commodity, w ith about 37 per cent of total fisheries 
production (live weight equivalent) entering international trade in various forms. Net 
seafood export trade from developing countries has increased from US$10 billion in 
1990 to US$18 billion in 2002 Total production  (capture and aquaculture) rose from 
118  million tons in 1997 to 132  million in 2003, although capture fish  production 
remained stable at around 84 million tons... The small scale fisheries sub-sector 
accounts for nearly 50 percent of global capture fisheries. Wherever poor people have 
been been  provided opportunities to participate in the higher value market of export 
species, they have increased their income substantially.  
However, in the absence of effective fisheries management measures, exports may 
have a tremendous adverse impact on fisheries resources in developing countries. 
High prices for fish exports has led to overcapacity  - excessive fishing effort, 
investment in modern, destructive fishing gear, and over fishing in several 
commercially important fisheries. In many countries this has led to a rapid depletion 
in coastal fisheries with a serious adverse impact on small scale fisheries. Foreign 
                                                  
133 See publications and reports of International Collective in Support of Fishworkers at www.icsf.net  
and www.icsf.org. See also Deere, Carolyn, Net Gains: Linking Fisheries Management, International 
Trade and Sustainable Development (IUCN, The World Conservation Union, 2000). 
(www.users.ox.ac.uk).   
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fleets from developed countries,  often  benefiting from subsidies, and imbalanced 
bilateral agreements, are also contributing to the depletion of national fishing zones, 
often illegally 134. Overall, in 12 of the 16 fishing regions identified by FAO, fish 
stocks are either fully exploited or depleted.  
Aquaculture has caused environmental degradation, for example by causing increased 
salinity of rice farms, and its expansion has been severely limited in many developing 
countries. Poor fishermen have not been able to acquire the capital to participate in 
aquaculture. Thus increased exports of fish and fish products have not benefited the 
majority of fisher folk and in many cases have actually led to increased poverty 
among fishermen.
135  
Barriers to Exports of Fish Products 
Tariffs on fresh, frozen or chilled fish, or primary fish products, are low in most 
developed  country export markets with the exception of the EC. Seafood is covered 
by the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) of the major developed trading 
countries. Tariff escalation presents the main barrier as tariffs on processed fish and 
fish products can  rise to 20 per cent, and there are greater in-quota and off-quota 
variations. Processing industries provide employment opportunities for women and 
supplement household income of fisher families. Additional trade barriers are being 
erected against developing country fisheries exports, (e.g. anti-dumping duties are 
proliferating). Sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures, such as food safety standards, 
environmental measures, such as eco-labelling and certification programmes, and 
compliance requirements with MEAs, present serious barriers to the participation of 
small fishermen in export markets.  
It is recognized that subsidies have contributed to an artificial  increase in fishing 
fleets and fishing capacity which has contributed to the depletion of stocks It i s 
estimated that such subsides account for up to 20% of dock  side revenues. A 
consensus seems to be emerging in the Doha Round “Rules negotiations that such 
subsides should be drastically reduced. However, there is also recognition of the need 
for public support to small scale fishers
136. 
Food Safety Standards and Small-scale Fisheries 
SPS regulations have become more stringent, excluding many producers, particularly 
poorer fishermen, from export markets. Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point 
(HACCP) – b ased systems and scientifically based risk assessment methods have 
been adopted by the United States, EC and Japan that together account for 75 to 80 
per cent in value of seafood imports (FAO 2004). The international regulatory 
framework for fish safety and quality is embodied in two agreements (SPS and TBT) 
of the WTO, and the standards, guidelines and recommendations developed by the 
relevant committees of the Codex Alimentarius. These safety and quality concepts are 
                                                  
134 See Chapter 4 of the UNDP Human Development Report 2005, op. cit.  
135 The section draws heavily from Tokrishna, Ruangrai, “The Fisheries Sector in Asian Countries, 
Sustainable Fisheries, Human Development and Trade Liberalization”, UNDP Asia Trade Initiative on 
Trade and Human Development, Phase 1, technical support document (Hanoi: 2003) (available at 
www.undprcc.lk/Publications/Publications.asp?C=4). 
136 See, for example, recent  proposals by Brazil TN/RL/GEN/79/Rev.4 and the United States 
TN/RL/GEN/145 on  www.wto.org  
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also enshrined in the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, particularly Articles 
6 and 11 (FAO 2004). Environmental regulations (e.g. shrimp/turtle issue) are also 
serious barriers for small fishermen. Voluntary eco-labeling schemes, designed to 
promote sustainable fisheries can also be a barrier as small scale fishermen are 
usually unable to organize so as to qualify. 
 
Box 21: Examples of How SPS Can Penalize the Poor 
From a small-scale fisheries perspective, in addition to the cost aspects, one of the main 
problems in adopting a HACCP plan would be the difficulty in implementing such a plan at 
the level of fish catch, especially for beach landing fishing units like kattumaram and canoes, 
for example, in India. According to EU and US standards, fish need to be stored in ice or to 
be kept in frozen storage as soon as they are harvested. Storage of fish in iceboxes would be 
difficult on board traditional fishing craft like kattumaram, which is made of lashed logs. Yet, 
many kattumaram using long lining and bottom set gillnets are used for catching fish for the 
export market. Strict implementation of HACCP plans could result in small producers which 
use such fishing craft being excluded from the export market.  
On reaching the fishing harbour or landing centre, traditional fishers are expected to handle 
fish for export markets without exposing them to the beach-sand  as a result of the fish 
handling standards of import markets. Many of the fishing villages that harvest fish, shrimp 
and cephalopods for the export market have only the beach for la nding their catch and it 
would be difficult for them to comply with a HACCP plan unless they invest in iceboxes and 
maintain them in a hygienic manner.  
 
While tariff escalation is a significant barrier, sanitary and environmental regulations 
pose the greatest barrier facing the entry of small fishermen in the world market as 
non-tariff barriers. These can be addressed at the multilateral level through negotiated 
improvements in the WTO SPS Agreement relating to equivalence of standards, and 
rules governing the use of eco-labeling. However, action is required at the bilateral 
level to provide financial and technical assistance and facilities to enable poor 
fishermen to meet national regulations of the importing country.  
A number of Multilateral Environmental Agreements  are aimed at preventing the 
depletion of fishery resources, particularly of migratory species. Some of these have 
trade provisions. It is important to ensure that the provisions of the WTO or FTAs 
cannot be used to frustrate the effective implementation of these MEAs. 
Developing countries are legislating to protect the interests of small fishermen, 
particularly by reducing capture of fish in EEZ waters and reserving portions of 
territorial waters for small fishermen.
137 Credit facilities to assist poor people to 
construct aquaculture facilities and export to world markets also provide strong 
support to poor fishermen. Measures to support the processing of fish products before 
export can also increase incomes and provide additional employment opportunities in 
this sector. 
                                                  
137 See Mathew, Sebastian,  Trade in Fisheries and Human Development in India, UNDP Asia Trade 
Initiative on Trade and Human Development, Phase 1, technical support document (Hanoi: 2003) 
(available at www.undprcc.lk/Publications/Publications.asp?C=4).  
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Annex 5A: Environmental Services 
The provision of environmental services is crucial to the achievement of MDG 7 
which includes targets to halve the proportion of people without sustainable access to 
safe water and basic sanitation and to significantly improve the lives of at least 100 
million slum dwellers by 2015. Governments are faced with the challenge of 
obtaining investment to upgrade and modernize water and sanitation services, while 
ensuring access to the poorer segments of the population.  
It is estimated that 1.1 billion people lack access to safe drinking water, while 2.6 
billion people lack adequate sanitation.
138 Almost half the people in the developing 
world have one or more diseases or infections associated with inadequate water 
supply and sanitation, of which 1.8 million die every year from diarrhoeal diseases. 
Inadequate water supply and sanitation are the main cause of child mortality, which 
MDG 4 aims at reducing by two-thirds. MDG 4 targets 10 and 11 aim at reducing by 
half the number of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water, and to 
achieve significant improvement in the lives of 100 million slum dwellers. 
Huge amounts of investment are required to achieve this goal, The investment 
requirements to  meet the world’s water needs are estimated at up to $180 billion 
annually and it is widely believed that such resources, and associated technology, are 
available mainly from the private sector. Given the large investments required in 
water projects and the long period of return on such investment, investors give 
priority to effective control. This can be facilitated by trade commitments on 
environmental services under GATS and other trade agreements. The WTO Doha 
Declaration singled out environmental goods  and services as priorities for 
liberalization. Plurilateral requests have sought full commercial presence for waste 
water and other environmental services (water for human consumption is not covered 
by these requests).  
The privatization of infrastructure services, however, has taken place in the context of 
a tense debate about the appropriate roles for the private sector in this area, and has 
led to major conflicts, especially around large-scale projects involving multinational 
companies. As an alternative to full-fledged privatization, several countries have 
opted for Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), where private partners are to differing 
extents involved in the design and construction of infrastructure and/or in the 
management, operation and/or the financing of assets. The privatization of the 
collection, purification and distribution of water is often met with opposition, 
particularly from those who stand to pay increasing costs to finance the improvements 
in water supply. In addition, there is concern that the benefits of these improvements 
flow to more affluent segments of the population. Transnational water companies 
operating in developing countries have shown a tendency to cherry pick  – 
concentrating on supplying large cities and those consumers who can pay market 
prices, while rural areas, small and medium cities and poor neighbourhoods have been 
disregarded.
139 In addition, liberalization in the waste management sub-sector of the 
environmental services market presents high risks of employment displacement, since 
excessive mechanization and modernization target the livelihoods of some of the 
                                                  
138 World Water Council: www.worldwatercouncil.org  
139 OECD, “Public-Private Partnerships in the Urban Water Sector”, Policy Brief (Paris: April 2003) 
(www.oecd.org/dataoecd/31/50/2510696.pdf).  
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poorest people.
140 Governments in developing countries are thus faced with a 
dilemma: how to obtain the necessary investment and related technology while 
ensuring that benefits are shared by all. 
Box 22: The 4
th World Water Forum 
The Ministerial Declaration of the 4
th World Water Forum held in Mexico city in March 2006 
reaffirmed that “governments have the primary role in promoting improved access to safe 
drinking water, basic sanitation, sustainable and secure tenure, and adequate shelter, through 
improved governance at all levels, and appropriate enabling environment and regulatory 
frameworks, adapting a pro-poor approach with the active involvement of all stakeholders” 
(see www.worldwaterforum4.org.mx).  
Environmental services are big business.  The global market for environmental 
services sector exceeded $365 billion, in 2002, 80 percent accounted for by water, 
sewage and solid waste management. The industry has a dual structure, with a small 
number of large firms accounting for about 50 per cent of output in individual market 
segments,(the three largest water operators account for more than 50 percent of the 
global market)141 while a large number of smaller firms account for the remainder. In 
developing countries, the emphasis has been on sewage treatment and water delivery.  
Private investment projects have targeted high and middle income countries: LDCs 
have hardly  been touched. For instance, less than 0.2 percent of all private sector 
investments in the water and sanitation sector of developing countries went to Sub-
Saharan Africa. Only 3 percent of the developing country population is provided with 
drinking water through private operators.  
Box 23: Buenos Aires Water Supply Privatization 
Questions remain about the assumption that market liberalization automatically produces 
improvements in the efficiency of water utilities and in the connection of new customers. In 
1993, following the advice of the IMF, the water supply system of Buenos Aires was 
privatized and placed in the hands of a consortium led by the French giant firm Suez. 
Although there were initially impressive gains in the extension of water infrastructure, the 
majority of the concessions’ negative impacts have been most deeply felt in the poorest 
sections of Buenos Aires
142. Many poor households fell into serious arrears and  were 
disconnected from the network, especially prior to 1998. Environmentally, those living in the 
poorest areas of the city have also been faced with the negative effects of rising groundwater 
and the health risks associated with nitrate-contaminated aquifers. These municipalities have 
some of the lowest average incomes in the Greater Buenos Aires area and yet a large part of 
the financial burden for extending the network has fallen on these households.
143. In March 
2006, the Government of Argentina cancelled the contract with Suez. 
                                                  
140 UNDP, International Trade in Environmental and Energy Services and Human Development, 
Discussion Paper, Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Initiative (Colombo, 2005) at p. 22, 
(www.undprcc.lk/Publications/Publications/International_trade-completed.pdf).  
141 Hilary, John, GATS and Water: The threat of services negotiations at the WTO, Save the Children  
UK (London, 2003) at p.16. 
142 See www.cbc.ca/fourth/deadinthewater/argentia2 
143 Loftus A. L. and D. A. McDonald, Of liquid dreams: A political ecology of water privatization in 
Buenos Aires, Environment&Urbanization, Vol 13 No 2, October 2001 
(www.queensu.ca/msp/pages/Project_Publications/Journals/Loftus.pdf). See also Hilary, John, GATS 
and Water, op. cit.   
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The UN Millennium Project Task force on Water and Sanitation requested countries 
to elaborate coherent water resources development and management plans to support 
the achievement of these goals. These plans should constitute a prerequisite to the 
negotiation of commitments in the environmental services sector.  
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Annex 5B: Energy services 
Attainment of the MDGs will require that modern energy be made available to a large 
proportion of the nearly two billion people who currently are reliant on traditional 
energy sources. Lack of access to energy not only undermines the productivity of an 
estimated one third of the world’s people but causes insecurity and hardship and 
threatens their health and future well being
144. It constitutes a particular burden for 
women, and provokes reduced life expectancy and higher rates of child mortality. 
Again, developing countries are faced with the need to obtain capital and technology 
while ensuring universal access and control over this strategic sector. 
Enormous investment required to meet world demand 
The World Energy Council estimates that enormous investments – about $100 billion 
annually – will be required to maintain adequate supplies of energy, and this alone 
will not ensure delivery to the poor.145 Energy services constitute the value added in 
the chain from the location of the potential energy source to its distribution to the final 
consumer. The dynamism of trade in the energy services sector is accelerating due to 
the increasing demand for energy, the liberalization of energy markets, increased 
investment in the energy sector, and  the introduction of new technologies. 
Many developing countries are engaged in structural reforms of the energy sector 
meant to cut costs and improve the economic performance and efficiency of the 
energy sector by imposing free-market disciplines and commercial criteria.
146 These 
can include deregulation (covering both the removal of regulations and the 
reassessment of regulatory methods), corporatization, (placing public energy utilities 
under commercial discipline), unbundling (i.e. breaking up vertically integrated state 
monopolies), increased private sector participation and outright privatization. Efforts 
to ensure competition require provisions to ensure access (third party access-TPA) to 
networks (grids, pipelines). 
The dismantling of state monopolies h as provided lucrative possibilities for the 
private sector and led to considerable interest in obtaining bound commitments on 
trade in energy services, which are the subject of requests in GATS and covered in 
FTAs. Such requests are aimed at gaining a share of dynamic “downstream” energy, 
particularly electricity trading markets, while seeking to gain control of “upstream” 
services to improve security of supply. The energy services market is estimated at 
$100 billion, but it implies control over the $3 billion global trade in energy. 147 
                                                  
144 See  Sieh Mei Ling  (ed.),  Investment, Energy and Environmental Services: Promoting Human 
Development in WTO Negotiations, University of Malaya, UNDP and Malaysian Institute of 
Economic Research (Kuala Lumpur, March 2004) (www.um.edu.my). 
145 1.6 billion people did not have access to electricity in 2002. According to the International Energy 
Agency's estimates, 1.4 billion people will still lack access to electricity in 2030. 
146  UNCTAD, “Managing "Request-Offer" Negotiations under the GATS: The Case of Energy 
Services”, UNCTAD/DITC/TNCD/2003/5 (Geneva: 2003). 
147 See UNDP, International Trade in Environmental and Energy Services and Human Development, 
op. cit.  
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How to ensure universal access?  
Governments of developing countries are seeking private sector participation to 
obtain the necessary capital and technology. The dilemma often faced by governments 
is how to obtain foreign investment to increase capacity and efficiency, whilst 
simultaneously keeping the price of electricity, in particular, at levels accessible to the 
poor. In the energy sector, conditions for entry and performance requirements are 
essential tools for ensuring tha t liberalization attains the ultimate objective of 
universal coverage. Such conditions may include price undertakings (as liberalization 
tends to result in increased prices if not controlled), universal service obligations and 
transfer of technology requirements. On the other hand, governments may need to 
subsidize investors in isolated regions, particularly those involved in renewable 
energy production (e.g. solar or wind energy). Fair and transparent rules governing 
TPA and cross subsidization can also en courage investors. The energy sector can be a 
source of employment for youth, providing higher paying jobs, both at home and 
abroad through MNP. In addition, it may be necessary to retain energy subsidies, but 
with more focus on the poor. Such requirements should be stipulated in GATS 
commitments or in FTA “reservations”. 
The scope of WTO negotiations on energy extends beyond the services sector. Energy 
importing countries are seeking to expand the rules on subsides to restrict “dual 
pricing” practices under which energy producing countries maintain prices for 
domestic consumers at levels below those prevailing on the world market. There are 
also initiatives to eliminate exports taxes, as a policy tool frequently used in the 
energy sector. 
Box 24: Energy Services Liberalization in Latin America 
Country-case studies carried out in Latin America in 2001 show that energy market 
liberalization has, on balance, been beneficial to countries that have implemented it. Both 
energy availability and the quality of the s ervice have been enhanced, mostly through (too 
broad in its sweep) rapid transfer of technology and systems, and more efficient modern 
management. However, energy accessibility and affordability, although better overall, has not 
improved for marginal popul ations. In general, market liberalization has tended to reduce 
employment in the sector as public monopoly enterprises tended to be over-staffed. 
Reductions in personnel in  privatized companies have been accompanied, however, by 
increases in the number of  jobs in contracting companies as a result of the increasing 
outsourcing of many activities.
148 Within the context of heavy reliance on services companies, 
there is still a great variety in the degree to which energy companies vertically integrate 
backwards or outsource services to external providers.
  
                                                  
148 World Energy Council (2001), Energy Markets in Transition: The Latin American and Caribbean 
Experience, London.  
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Box 25: Strategies for Strengthening Energy Services Competitiveness –  
The case of Venezuela 
Some energy-producing developing countries have adopted successful polices aimed at 
developing a strong domestic upstream energy service sector (exploration, extraction, drilling 
and other construction services) as a stimulus to development. For example, in 1980 PDVSA 
- the Venezuelan state oil company  - established a policy aimed at the development of 
Venezuelan engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) companies. Foreign EPC 
companies had to establish partnerships or joint ventures with local companies to be invited 
as bidders for contracts. The partnerships had to produce transfer of technology and training. 
The management of the projects had to be shared between foreign and Venezuelan 
executives. On the other hand, attractive contracting conditions were applied and stable work 
loads were offered. As a result, in 2001, 90 percent of EPC contracts were executed by local 
EPC companies, up from 20 percent in 1980. In the same year, there were more than 140 
firms of various sizes and degrees of specialization.  
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Annex 5C: Financial services 
Stability in the financial sector is essential for the achievement of the MDGs. 
Financial crises have plunged millions of people into poverty and set development 
efforts back decades. The burden of adjustment in such crises is inevitably borne by 
the poor. Nevertheless, developing countries are again confronted with requests to 
further liberalize their financial service regimes. 
Differing Commitments to Financial Reform 
Enhanced competition in the financial services sector was expected to result in lower 
fees; improved quality and choice of services; access to new products and 
technologies; and access to new sources of capital. Liberalization measures have 
included the withdrawal of government intervention by privatizing state-owned 
financial entities; freeing interest rates and leaving credit allocation to be determined 
by the market; the removal of regulations, either quantitative or qualitative that 
discriminate against foreign financial entities; and the removal of restrictions on intra-
sectoral activities by financial entities.  The approach of d eveloping countries to 
financial r eform has varied including (a) deregulation of domestic markets with 
restrictions on new entrants, either general or only to foreign providers, (b) reform has 
been accompanied by the liberalization of the capital account, while in other cases 
regulations r estricting movement of capital were maintained, (c) withdrawal of all 
state ownership of financial entities was terminated, or the maintenance of state 
participation in development banks, (d) full liberalization of commercial presence 
combined with restrictions on cross-border trade, (e) different approaches to the speed 
of the reform and in the sequencing between financial sector liberalization and 
regulatory upgrading. 
The liberalization of financial services has been given specific focus in the WTO, as a 
result of acute pressure  by developed countries, to the extent that additional 
negotiations (concluding in 1998) were held in this sector, after the Uruguay Round, 
to obtain further liberalization. The GATS commitments reflect the policy tools that 
developing country governments have retained to manage the financial sector. These 
include limitations on the opening of new banks, restrictions on foreign ownership, 
nationality requirements for directors, no commitments regarding “new financial 
services” etc. Some have been aimed at reserving segments of the financial sector for 
disadvantaged segments of the population.
149 Despite the experience of financial 
crises over recent years, some FTAs have pushed financial liberalization even further. 
Impact of Liberalization 
Countries undertaking liberalization of the financial sector have experienced a fast 
increase in the participation of foreign financial entities in the market at the expense 
of domestic firms. Domestic financial entities have been bought by foreign firms or 
have left the market, not being able to compete any longer. Concentration in the 
domestic market has taken place since, increasingly, a smaller number of financial 
entities control a larger share of the financial market. Financial liberalization has not 
always contributed to increasing lending to the private sector as a percentage of GDP. 
                                                  
149 The concluding meting of the financial services negotiations was held up to the early hours of the 
morning as Malaysia successfully resisted attempts to dilute its pro-Bumiputera policy in the financial 
sector.  
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On the contrary, a sharp decline has been observed after the reform. SMEs and 
operators in the agriculture sector have been particularly affected by limited access to 
credit. Experience shows that countries should carefully assess the potential 
implications of reform on the basis of national realities,150 designing appropriate 
financial services liberalization policies to suit country-specific conditions; 
determining the potential costs and benefits of reforms and also the appropriate pace 
and sequence of the process. In the absence of adequate prudential policy, 
liberalization may contribute to financial instability. 
Box 26: The Thai Experience 
The Thai experience and financial crisis in 1997  shows that "fast and furious" liberalization 
has not worked well. Liberalization should have been planned as a process and implemented 
in steps rather than being set out as an objective to be achieved through incoherent policy 
measures. The experience also demonstrates how challenging it is to adapt external fast 
developments to a country's needs and readiness. The rapidly growing banking system and 
the influx of short term foreign capital proved, for instance, to be too much and too fast for 
the Thai authorities to catch-up with on the regulatory front. While financial reform and the 
strengthening of the financial system are of paramount importance, they should be devised 
and implemented on a continuous basis and not only when an acute need or extraordinary 







   
 
                                                  
150 International Monetary Fund, International Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects, and Key 
Policy Issues (Washington, DC: September 2000) 
(http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/icm/2000/01/eng/index.htm). 
151 WTO, Communication from Thailand - Assessment of Trade in Services, document TN/S/W/4, 22 
July 2002.  
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Annex 5D: Distribution services 
Liberalizing distribution services is seen as a means of increasing productivity, lower 
prices, greater product choice and distribution formats, and technological innovation. 
However, small domestic competitors cannot compete with large retail chains thus 
eliminating employment opportunities for the poor. The concentration of ownership at 
the world level can operate so as to marginalize small producers. Developing 
countries must devise policies in this sector that provide benefits for all, in the face of 
further requests for liberalization.  
Strategic Role of Distribution Services 
Distribution services are closely linked with other services such as transport, 
packaging, warehousing, financial services and commercial real estate development 
and have become a vehicle in international trade and competitiveness. The 
distribution chain has become shorter, and a direct relationship between producers 
and retailers has emerged, driven by enabling technologies and the desire to lower 
transaction costs. Rapid diffusion and incorporation of new business methods and 
technologies have brought about fundamental institutional and organizational changes 
related to procurement, inventory control, management methods and payment 
formula. The presence of large international retailers can become an avenue for 
increasing exports, incorporating domestic suppliers into the global procurement 
network, as well as being conducive to the improvement of local worker skills, 
especially in logistics, marketing and management.  
Concentration of Ownership 
Ownership in both retail and wholesale sectors has become highly concentrated . The 
top 200 retailers account for 30 per cent of worldwide retailing sales. The growing 
presence of foreign retailing conglomerates in many developing countries is 
transforming highly competitive markets, with tens of thousands of small firms 
competing in the different market segments, into a situation in which a small number 
of firms control most of the industry turnover. This has led to smaller local suppliers 
being forced out of the market. 
The distribution sector accounts for a sizeable share of non-agricultural employment 
in developing countries – for example 6-7 percent in India – and it is significantly 
higher than in developed countries.
152 Small shops play a crucial social role as 
employers of poor people who migrate from rural to urban areas,: they perform 
therefore a crucial social role that big chains would be unable to perform. Moreover, 
shifting the social status of people from that of shop owners to that of shop employees 
has the effect of shrinking the middle class, with negative social and political 
implications. 
The dominance of large firms in the distribution service sector is having a profound 
impact on the wholesale segment of the market, and on local suppliers of goods, in 
particular in the farm sector. Developing country suppliers of foodstuffs find 
themselves bearing the  brunt of price competition among distribution chains while 
                                                  
152 See UNCTAD, Distribution Services, TD/B/COM.1/EM.29/2, (Geneva, 2005).  
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small farmers find themselves left out due to their inability to meet the quality and 
delivery standards imposed by the firms themselves.
153 
Conditions for Liberalization  
Developing countries are thus seeking trade-offs so as to obtain the benefits of the 
presence of large distribution chains while protecting and stimulating the role of small 
retail outlets as a source of employment for poor people, and ensuring access to 
distribution chains for smal l producers. This can be accomplished through techniques 
such as limitations on the number of branches of foreign chains, economic needs 
tests, (which can be inscribed in GATS commitments), and the support to SMEs 
though training in management and distribution processes
154 and credit facilities. 
Opening up the retail market without ensuring the necessary conditions for fair 
competition has often not yielded the expected welfare gains. Such action may need 
to be complemented by the setting up of vigorous and clear anti-trust legislation 
aimed at regulating cartels, predatory behaviour, abuses of market power and 
deceptive practices, and at promoting consumer welfare; policies aimed at supporting 
retail diversity and entrepreneurship; the extension of unfair contract law to business-
to-business contracts; measures aimed at the proper implementation of trade marks 
and copyright law; the setting up of franchise law, including mandatory disclosure of 
information; and the development of soft law instruments, such as  codes of good 
practices, which have proved very effective in regulating buyers' anti-competitive  
behaviour.  
Box 27: Expansion of Supermarket Chains 
In the food retail business, there has been an impressive expansion of supermarket chains 
both domestic and foreign, with Latin America leading the way among developing regions. 
Supermarkets' share rose from 20 percent of total national food retailing in 1990 to 50–60 
percent of total turnover in 2002. The development of supermarket chains in Asia and Africa 
has followed a pattern similar to that of Latin America, but with a later take-off. The share of 
supermarket chains in grocery retail is currently around 33 percent in Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Thailand and around 63 percent in the Republic of Korea, Taiwan (China) and the 
Philippines. On the other hand, supermarket penetration in India stands at only 5 percent. The 
most recent venue for supermarket take-off is Africa, especially Eastern and Southern Africa; 
in South Africa, supermarket chains represents 55 percent of total national groceries sales, 
while in Nigeria they still account for only 5 percent.  
                                                  
153 See Chapter 4, UNDP Human Development Report 2005, op. cit.. 
154 In Colombia, for example, the modernization and liberalization of distribution services has had a 
negative impact on medium- and small-sized companies, which have been displaced from the market. 
The Government has, then, implemented a special programme - PYMECO - to support small retailers 
through training in management and distribution processes. 
154 Ibid., at 9  
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Annex 5F: Health services 
The provision of health services to the poor is central to the achievement of MDGs  
4,5 and 6. The pressures for foreign participation in health sectors have arisen at a 
moment when the impact of the WTO and other trade agreements on health is a 
subject of major concern to the international community. Commitments on health in 
GATS and other trade agreements can impact the provision of basic health services to 
the poor.
155.  As already noted, the 2001 WTO Ministerial Declaration on the Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement and Public Health 
was deemed necessary to protect developing countries against bilateral pressures from 
powerful trading partners who were undermining their rights to  generic access to 
medicines. International health experts have strongly and continually cautioned 
prudence to developing countries in committing themselves to allowing foreign 
providers of health services, including health insurance,  companies from entering 
their markets. 
While the role of the private sector in providing health services varies from country to 
country, most WTO members have declined to make commitments in this sector. 
Many countries desire the latest medical technology and high-tech hospitals and 
training facilities. The existence of such facilities is also seen as an inducement to 
foreign investment. However, there is a concern that the foreign private sector will 
drain human and financial resources from the national sectors, both public and 
private, and lead to a two tier health system, one for the rich and one for the poor.  As 
the greatest challenge facing developing countries in the health sector is to provide 
affordable access to quality services for the rural poor, the presence of foreign private 
suppliers could make little contribution to, and more likely frustrate these efforts.  
Foreign participation in the health services sector can  also  take place through the 
provision of health insurance. International health experts consider that while, in 
theory, greater access for health insurance companies could stimulate competition and 
reduce costs, in actual practice, evidence shows that greater competition among health 
insurers segments and destabilizes the market in addition to undermining the ability to 
build larger, more equitable risk pools that spread costs between rich and poor, 
healthy and sick. In particular, it is crucial to prevent wealthier population groups 
from opting out of national health insurance schemes. Foreign health insurance should 
not operate in  a manner that undermines universal compulsory health insurance 
systems. The experience of some developing countries with  Health Maintenance 
Organizations (HMOs), which create a captive supply of medical staff, has been 
particularly discouraging156 International health experts advise that the entry of 
foreign suppliers makes it more urgent for countries to create an effective regulatory 
framework for the health insurance sector, and that until such a system is in place it 
could be harmful for developing countries to make full commitments in the health 
insurance sub-sector under GATS financial service schedules.
157 
                                                  
155 For links to the international debate on trade in health services see Choike,  Health and Health 
Services, Goods for Sale (www.choike.org/nuevo_eng/informes/1007.html).  
156 See, for example, “Consensus Paper on Managed Care Organizations”, developed by Association of 
Private Hospitals of Malaysia, 10 April 2001 (www.hospitals -malaysia.org). 
157 See Lipson, Debra, GATS and Health Insurance Services, Background Note for WHO Commission 
on Macroeconomics and Health, CMH Working Paper 4:7, June 2001 
(http://www.cmhealth.org/docs/wg4_paper7.pdf).  
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A number of developing countries are exporting health services. Patients come to 
developing countries for medical treatment not only because of lower costs, but also 
to obtain traditional medical treatment, and often to enjoy more labor intensive and 
compassionate treatment from medical staff. However, health export policies can 
impact, both positively and negatively, domestic heath care, in particular, access to 
health services by the poor.  Such access on  people living in poverty can depend on 
the number of medical staff and facilities in the exporting country and the regulatory 
structure that is established.
158  
Developing countries that expend resources on the treatment of foreign patients are 
likely to be diverting resources from domestic needs. In addition, by offering more 
attractive employment conditions, they exacerbate shortages of skilled staff in public 
facilities, on which the poor rely.  The export of health services through Mode 2 
(“health tourism”) requires a comprehensive strategy based on an analysis of the 
potential gains and the i mpacts on the national health system and access for the poor. 
These impacts will differ among countries, as a function of specific characteristics of 
the health system of each potential exporting country , but in many cases, could be 
negative.  
                                                  
158 See WHO/UNCTAD study International Trade in Health Services: a Development Perspective 
UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/5, WHO/TFHE/98.1 (Geneva: 1998).  
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